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THE EVALUATIVE CHAMELEON: THE VALANCE OF OBSERVED 
ACTION OUTCOMES DETERMINES AUTOMATIC IMITATION 
 
Abstract 
Humans have a tendency to imitate the actions they observe in others, a process 
assumed to rely on an automatic bottom-up mapping of observed action features to 
one’s own motor system. In contrast, imitation in children is goal-directed, aimed at 
achieving the same outcome as the model. This thesis examines whether such an 
outcome-dependence can also be observed in automatic imitation.  
In six experiments, participants watched an actor make movements after observing the 
same movements and evaluated the valence of these outcomes with either compatible or 
incompatible responses. Chapter 2 showed that automatic imitation depends on action 
outcomes and showed that it is (1) independent from the visual perspective from which 
the action was observed, but (2) does require identification with the model. Chapter 3 
showed that this outcome-dependency is observed in observations of human interactions 
but not when this element is replaced with non-human stimuli. 
In chapter 4, 2 experiments in which, the participants’ own action kinematics were 
measured in an alternating reaching task firstly replicated the well-known sIOR effect 
such that participants were slower to reach to the same target as the previous player. In 
contrast to other studies on this effect these experiments revealed tentative evidence that 
the effect depended upon whether the kinematics required to produce the response bore 
a similarity to the kinematics of the action one has just observed. 
Together, the findings in this thesis reveal that imitation cannot simply be attributed to a 
simple bottom-up matching of observed actions to one’s own action repertoires. Instead, 
similar to goal directed imitation in children, automatic imitation may be guided by 
hierarchical action-outcome representations that are dynamically established when 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1. Two Types of Imitation 
Imitation is a behaviour in which an individual observes and replicates another's 
behaviour. It is observed in human adults and children, in non-human primates and 
several other species (see Flanders, 1968, for a review; Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & de 
Waal, 2006). Already in the 19th century, theorists have argued about how this phenomenon 
should be understood and characterized. Darwin (1871, p. 47), for example, described imitation 
as a brutish, blind and irrational force in human affairs, driven by a complex instinct separate 
from human reasoning abilities. 
“…much of the intelligent work done by man is due to imitation and not to 
reason; but there is this great difference between his actions and many of those 
performed by the lower animals, namely, that man cannot, on his first trial, 
make, for instance, a stone hatchet or a canoe, through his power of imitation. 
[…] The principle of Imitation is strong in man, and especially in man in a 
barbarous state”. 
 
Others however, considered imitation to be a sophisticated cognitive process, crucial for 
enculturation and development (Washburn, 1908). Washburn (1917, p. 12) believed 
imitation to be driven by our self-consciousness and our conception of others’ beliefs 
and desires and the key to understanding their experiences. 
“First, since it is only on the basis of our own inner experience that we can 
interpret the inner experience of others, it becomes clear that the greatest 
contribution to the development of ejective consciousness will come from those 
forms of social behaviour where individuals perform like functions”. 
 
Investigations into the current literature on imitation reveal that both these 
interpretations could be valid, as they match onto two distinct types of imitation that are 
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typically observed and tested in psychological experiments. The first type – termed 
automatic imitation – describes simple involuntary replication of observed behaviours, 
seen in the human tendency to mimic other people’s gestures, body language, accent, 
posture and other behaviours with no awareness or strategic intent (Van Baaren, 
Maddux, Chartrand, de Bouter, & van Knippenberg, 2003; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
The second type – often termed goal-directed imitation or imitation proper – is more 
complex (Heyes, 2003), describing an intentional act to achieve the same (rewarding) 
outcomes as the model, for example for purpose of acquiring novel behaviours 
(Tomasello, 1996). 
  
1.1 Automatic imitation 
The unintentional type of imitation is easily demonstrated using the simple child’s game 
of ‘Simon Says’. In this game, young children stand in a line facing the leader (‘Simon’) 
who gives them verbal action instructions which Simon also models. These actions are 
varied but simple, such as to hop on one leg or touch one’s nose. Importantly, these 
actions must be imitated by the other children only when the order begins with the 
phrase “Simon says”. Any child, who imitates the action without the prefix “Simon 
Says”, is out of the game. All players are aware that the goal of the game is only to 
imitate after the correct instruction is given. Despite this, the incorrect imitation of 
Simon persists throughout the game.  
In the lab, automatic imitation began to be studied in the 1990’s (e.g., Craighero, 
Fadiga, Rizzolatti & Umilta 1998; Byrne & Russon, 1998). It led to the development of 
a specific version of the stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) paradigm, in which the 
same body movements are used for both stimuli and responses (e.g., Brass, Bekkering 
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and Prinz, 2001; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). In this paradigm, participants 
have to execute different responses as quickly as possible in response to task-relevant, 
imperative cues. These cues are presented in synchrony with task-irrelevant cues, which 
either match the movement required for a correct response (imitative), or do not match 
this movement (non-imitative). Responses elicited by matching trials are faster and 
more accurate than trials that are non-matching, revealing an imitation-based 
compatibility effect based on constituent bodily movements.  
In a seminal study, for example, Brass, Bekkering and Prinz (2000) compared 
participants’ ability to produce finger-lifts when seeing matching versus mismatching 
finger-lifts on the screen. They found that matching (imitative) responses were 
performed faster than non-matching (non-imitative) responses. These findings were 
replicated by a large range of other investigations that revealed similar effects for other 
action types, such as finger movements (Bertenthal, Longo & Kosobud, 2006), hand 
grasps (Heyes, Bird, Johnson & Haggard, 2005), arm, leg, and head movements (e.g., 
Bach & Tipper, 2007; Bach, Peatfield & Tipper, 2007; Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, 
Brass & Heyes., 2008; Heyes & Ray, 2004), as well as kinematic features of movement 
trajectories (e.g., Kilner, Hamilton, & Blakemore, 2007; Bach, Bayliss & Tipper, 2010). 
The effects have been described with many labels, from “visuomotor priming” 
(Craighero, Fadiga, Umilta & Rizzolatti, 1996), “movement compatibility” (Brass et al, 
2000), “motor facilitation by action observation” (Edwards, Humphreys & Castiello, 
2003), “body part priming” (Bach & Tipper, 2007), “effector priming” (Gillmeister  et 
al., 2008), “movement interference” (Gowen, Stanley & Miall, 2008) and “motor 
mimicry” (Spengler, Brass, Kuhn & Schütz-Bosbach, 2010). It is now commonly 
referred to as Automatic imitation (Liepelt, von Cramon & Brass, 2008; Heyes, 2010).  
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Since then, research has started to investigate the characteristics of these effects. For 
example, several studies have shown that imitative compatibility is, at least to some 
extent, independent from spatial compatibility, persisting when controls for other 
compatibility relationships are in place (e.g., Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Bertenthal, Longo 
& Kosobud, 2006). For example, when the above finger tapping experiment by Brass 
and colleagues (2000) was replicated and included a condition where the hand stimuli 
were static, and responses were cued by an ‘x’ appearing on the finger nail of the hand, 
responses times were markedly reduced and followed not imitative compatibility, but a 
pattern of spatial compatibility (Brass, Derrfuss & von Cramon., 2005).    
Others have tested if the facilitation of imitative responses is truly automatic. Catmur 
(2015), for example, found that imitative compatibility effects were present under both 
low and high perceptual load. Others have shown that they persist even when attention 
is directed away from the observed action (Brass et al., 2000; but see Bach, Peatfield & 
Tipper, 2007) although these effects may be reduced. Due to findings like these, it is 
now a widely held assumption that imitation is indeed automatic and occurs in the face 
of conflicting goals and intentions (Stürmer, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2000). Theorists 
therefore describe it as “unintentional” (Richardson, Marsh, Isenhower, Goodman, & 
Schmidt, 2007), “unconscious”, “non-conscious” (Belot, Crawford, & Heyes, 2013; van 
Baaren et al., 2003), or, indeed, “automatic” (Obhi & Hogeveen, 2013; Heyes, 2011). 
A related phenomenon might be people’s tendency to copy their interaction partner’s 
behaviours and body posture (Stel, & Vonk, 2010) in everyday social interactions, first 
measured by Chartrand and Bargh (1999). As in automatic imitation, people are 
typically not aware of its occurrence, and they use it non-strategically and non-
intentionally. However, while this behaviour seems to be similar on the surface, there is 
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evidence that it might reflect an independent process, being not correlated with 
automatic imitation as measured in the lab (Genschow, van Den Bossche, Cracco, 
Bardi, Rigoni, & Brass, 2017). 
The discovery of mirror neurons provided the first evidence of a physiological 
perception-action link that may underlie automatic imitation. Mirror neurons are 
neurons in the monkey premotor F5 region, recorded at a single cell level using 
microelectrodes, known to be involved in the control of the monkey’s own simple 
actions, such as reaching and grasping, or opening a peanut. The surprising finding was 
that some of these neurons would also fire if the monkey was completely passive but 
saw the same (or a similar) action being executed by someone else (di Pellegrino et al., 
1992; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; for a recent review, see Hamilton, 2015). For 
example, a neuron that fires during the monkey’s own reach towards a small (but not 
large) object would also fire if the monkey was completely passive but observed 
somebody reach for a small object.  While these neurons were first recorded in area F5 
of the premotor cortex of monkeys (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese Fadiga, Fogassi 
& Rizzolatti, 1996) they were later also found to be present in the inferior parietal 
cortex (Fogassi et al., 1998; Gallese et al., 2001) and to capture not only the action’s 
visual but also their auditory properties. As an example, a mirror neuron that fires when 
a monkey tears a piece of paper also responds when the monkey observes another 
tearing a piece of paper and to the sound of paper tearing without visual input (Keysers, 
Kohler, Umilta, Fogassi & Gallese, 2003).  
Recording single neurons is less practical for the study of human brains. Therefore, 
most of the evidence for mirror neurons in humans comes about indirectly (although see 
Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010), using measures such functional 
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magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Despite the difficulties, these studies have 
revealed homologous regions in human brains in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and 
areas of the inferior parietal lobe, which together are referred to as the Mirror Neuron 
System (Binder, Dovern, Hesse, Ebke,& Karbe, 2017; Rizzolatti et al., 2004). Since 
then, mirror properties have been discovered in other areas of the brain including the 
Supplementary Motor Area (but not pre supplementary motor area) (Zentgraf & 
Munzert, 2005), Insula (Acharya & Shukla, 2012), Primary Somatosensory Cortex 
(Keysers & Gazzola, 2010) and anterior cingulate cortex (Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 
2008; for a review see Rizzolatti, & Luppino, 2001). Together, these regions may form 
a “mirror system” that maps observed behaviours onto behaviours the observer can 
execute themselves. This matching is assumed to provide the observer with an internal 
motor model of the actions they are observing, which can drive imitation (e.g., 
Iacoboni, 2005; Rizzolatti., 2005).  
While the above studies typically measure the automatic copying – or at least faster 
execution – of the observed body movements, automatic imitation does not always need 
to happen on the level of the body movements or action kinematics. Instead, several 
studies suggest that observers can also automatically copy actions on a higher level, 
capturing their goals or intended outcomes. For example, Liepelt and colleagues (2008) 
have shown that people imitate the inferred goal of an action (intending to lift a finger) 
rather than what is actually observed (finger held in place by a clamp). Similarly, Bach, 
Bayliss and Tipper (2011) have observed that observed reach directions are only 
mirrored if the reach seemed to be directed to an available goal object, and actions have 
been found to be imitated particularly if they are assumed to reflect the behaviour of an 
intentional agent (Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006) rather than an inanimate virtual 
computer hand.   
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Other studies have investigated the role of biological and non-biological stimuli in 
driving automatic imitation. Human movements were compared to ball movements in a 
study by Kilner, Hamilton & Blakemore (2007). These movements either followed a 
biological bell-shaped curve, or a non-biological constant directional movement profile. 
They found that the shape of the moving agent (human/ball) did not matter, as both 
human and ball movements interfered with own action kinematics equally. The 
movement profile, however, proved important: interference was observed in the human-
biological movement condition but not in the non-biological movement condition. A 
study by Stanley and colleagues (2007) provided similar results. Moving dot stimuli 
were presented with either a biological or non-biological velocity profile, but it was 
manipulated whether participants believed the observed movements to be computer-
generated or produced by a human actor. Automatic imitation effects were only found 
when participants attributed the movements to a human agent (for similar results, see 
Longo, et al., 2009).  
These results confirm that automatic imitation occurs for a broad range of stimuli but 
may be tied to the observation of intentional agents, with biological motion trajectories. 
They have prompted the argument that automatic imitation arises from interplay of both 
the observed action and the actor’s current goals (Wohlschläger, Gattis, & Bekkering, 







1.2 Goal directed imitation 
Goal-directed imitation involves a person observing another performing a goal-directed 
action and then replicating that action themselves, with the goal of achieving the same 
outcome as the model. This form of goal-directed imitation, or “imitation proper”, has 
been argued to guide behaviour at all ages but is mostly studied in human children and 
primates (e.g., Call & Carpenter, 2002; Gattis, Bekkering & Wohlschläger, 2002; 
Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993; Bach, Allami Khalaf, Tucker & Ellis, 2014). It has 
been argued to provide a foundation for skill acquisition, avoiding time-consuming trial 
and error learning (Bekkering, Wohlschläger & Gattis., 2000). It is viewed as a top-
down guided, “rational” process, in which the imitator links seen body movements (the 
“means”) to the changes they produce in the environment (the “ends”), and then uses 
these means-ends-relationships to achieve the same outcomes (for a review, see Elsner, 
2007).  
Goal-directed imitation is often investigated using errors of reproduction. In a classic 
study, Bekkering and colleagues (2000) sat children at a table opposite an experimenter 
who instructed them to ‘do what I do’. The experimenter then placed either their left or 
right hand onto the table ipsilaterally (right hand placed onto the right side of the table) 
or contralaterally (right hand placed onto the left side of the table) to their seated 
position. In all cases children imitated both components, using the correct hand and the 
correct placement (left or right) on the table. However, in a further experimental 
session, the experiment was modified to include a target for the movements: a large red 
dot or target placed on the table. The experimenter then placed their left or right hand 
onto the target which again would produce an ipsilateral or contralateral movement, 
identical to that of the other session. Children imitated ipsilateral movements with great 
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accuracy but made many imitation errors in the contralateral condition, often using the 
arm closest to the target rather than the arm used by the experimenter. This suggests that 
the presence of the target had altered how children conceptualized the goal of the 
interaction. The goal had been converted from imitating the kinematics of a movement 
to imitating the reach towards a particular target, with less weight given to how it was 
achieved. This type of imitation is now referred to as goal-directed imitation because 
observers do not focus on the imitation of isolated bodily movements. Instead, they 
imitate the goal of the observed act (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Gattis, 
Bekkering, & Wohlschläger, 2002). 
In a similar study (Gattis, Bekkering, & Wohlschläger, 2002), 12 and 18-month-olds 
took part in an imitation experiment where the experimenter moved a toy mouse across 
the table. In one condition the experimenter moved the mouse to one of two houses 
using a hopping motion. In another condition, there were no houses present, but the 
experimenter made the same hopping action with the mouse and placed it in one of the 
two locations. As in the study of Bekkering and colleagues (2000), the presence of the 
houses as potential action goals determined how the action was imitated. When the 
house was present both age groups were more likely to simply move the mouse to the 
correct location and ignored the manner of movement. In contrast, when the houses 
were not present, children were more likely to move the mouse in a similar way to the 
experimenter, recreating the hopping action. Thus, even though children in both 
conditions were shown identical actions, they selectively imitated differing aspects 
dependent on whether the action seemed to have a goal (houses present) or not (houses 
absent). This suggests that even children of a young age interpret the actions of other’s 
in relation to a means-end relationship or goal hierarchy and select the most important 
goals to imitate, while ignoring others (Bekkering et al., 2000; Gattis et al., 2002).  
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Several other findings have revealed such goal-directed modes of imitation in children. 
From 12 months of age onwards, children particularly imitate actions that produce 
salient outcomes (Hauf, Elsner, and Aschersleben, 2004; Corriveau, Min, Chin & Doan, 
2016; Huang, Heyes & Charman, 2002), learn new action-outcome relations from 
observation (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Meltzoff, 1988a), and during 
imitation, they focus on reproducing these outcomes and check whether they were 
indeed achieved (Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello, 2005; Carpenter, Nagell & 
Tomasello, 1998b; Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003). As they become older, imitation 
becomes more flexible, but the fundamental outcome-guidedness remains. For example, 
they distinguish between a model’s intended and incidental outcomes and primarily 
imitate the former (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Bellagamba & Tomasello, 
1999), they correct observed unsuccessful actions during imitation (Meltzoff, 1995; 
Over & Gattis, 2010), and they readily use different body movements, should they 
allow them to achieve the outcome more effectively (i.e. “emulation”, Tomasello, 1996; 
Gergely, et al., 2002; Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007). 
Despite the above review, children’s imitation does not always focus on an action’s 
higher-level aspects, such as goals and outcomes. Studies have revealed that infants 
under school age sometimes imitate an action’s form with great fidelity, even if not 
required to achieve the action’s goal, to the extent that a cost is incurred to the 
efficiency of such actions (Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; Whitten, 
McGuigan, 2009). This phenomenon of “over-imitation” has motivated different 
explanations, each of which however still sees it as a further instance of goal-directed 




The ‘‘automatic coding hypothesis” and the associated ‘‘copy-all-refine-later 
hypothesis” propose that over-imitation happens as a consequence of infants encoding 
all of the intentional actions performed by an adult as causally meaningful (Lyons et al., 
2011). In this view, the infant still imitates in a goal directed manner. However, they 
experience causal confusion, erroneously believing that the additional irrelevant actions 
are necessary for successful task performance. The pervasiveness of over-imitation in so 
many studies is often taken to support this hypothesis, despite conditions which attempt 
to minimise its occurrence by teaching children in advance the manner required to 
identify ‘silly’ actions (Lyons, Young & Keil,  2007), or giving children the opportunity 
to attempt tasks in advance of an inefficient demonstration (Nielsen & Tomasello, 
2010).  
On the other side of the coin is the ‘‘social affiliation hypothesis”. It interprets over-
imitation as an active attempt to create affiliation with others (Nielsen, 2006). 
Accordingly, children imitate irrelevant action parts not because they want to achieve 
the action’s outcome, but because they want to signal similarity with the model. This 
account is supported by evidence that children selectively imitate irrelevant actions 
which they include in the presence of an inefficient demonstrator but omit in the 
presence of an efficient demonstrator (Nielsen & Blank, 2011). Again, however, it 
suggests that over-imitation is goal-directed, where the child flexibly decides what 
aspects of the action is the most important aspect for its own goals (signalling 
similarity), and then imitates this aspect in particular. 
Finally, it has been argued that “over-imitation” may reflect a different mode of goal 
directed learning, which focusses on copying an action’s conventional forms, rather 
than those required for achieving a particular outcome (Watson-Jones, Legare, 
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Whitehouse, & Clegg, 2014). In other words, for conventionally defined actions (e.g. 
how to greet someone), the particular form is the outcome that needs to be achieved. 
This form of imitation is therefore believed to underpin affiliation with others and 
facilitate cooperation, whilst avoiding ostracism (Over & Carpenter, 2012). Consistent 
with such conventional learning accounts, children have a greater tendency to over-
imitate when conventional verbal cues are used to frame the task. For example, 3 to 6-
year-olds were presented with a video clip in which actors used a specific order of 
actions to take pegs from a board. The framing of the task demonstration was either 
conventional – the model “always” does it this way – or oriented towards the potential 
outcome: the given actions gets the pegs “up”. Children imitated the model’s lower 
level body movements in the conventional condition with great accuracy and justified 
their actions afterwards (“I had to do it the way they did it”). In contrast, children 
focussed on achievement of the outcome, when the task instructions were presented as 
outcome related. These children justified their behaviour instrumentally as independent 
agents (“I can do what I want”) (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). 
Together, therefore, goal-directed imitation in children is a sophisticated process. 
Different action components (causal nature, action goal or effector used) may become 
salient during the observation of actions, and cause imitation to be focussed on them, 
depending on the context of the action and the child’s own goals. Goal-directed 
imitation may therefore closely map onto automatic behaviour in adults, which similarly 
can show a focus on the actions’ form, or the outcomes it produces, suggesting that the 





2. Theoretical approaches  
Different theories have been proposed to account for imitation. They differ on which 
form of imitation they address – goal directed or automatic imitation – and whether they 
can account for the copying of the action’s forms (the observed body movements; e.g. 
Meltzoff & Moore, 1979; Meltzoff, 2002) or their higher-level goals (the outcomes to 
be achieved; e.g. Dindo, & Schillaci, 2010). They also differ in whether they take a 
generalist view, assuming imitation to be based on domain-general learning 
mechanisms (Greenwald, 1970; Heyes, 2001), or a specialist view that presupposes a 
specifically evolved mechanism (e.g., Gallese & Goldman., 1998). The following 
section reviews the most important approaches. 
 
2.1 Nativist vs. Learning Accounts 
Nativist accounts of imitation (e.g., Meltzoff, 1993; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009) 
propose a direct link between perception of others and one’s own behaviour that has 
arisen through evolutionary history, giving rise to a specific cognitive “module” for 
imitation. In particular, they argue that the reproductive advantages engendered by 
imitation – learning of instrumental and conventional behaviours – makes it likely that it 
falls into the “adaptation” category for behaviour, for which specific brain mechanisms 
have evolved through natural selection and which are now stored in the genome. For 
example, Meltzoff and Moore (1997) argued that infants are born with innate imitative 
abilities specialised for imitation of specific stimuli (such as facial movements), which 
require little environmental input in order to develop. They called this innate module a 
specialised super-intermodal mechanism that matches observed actions to self-produced 
actions, potentially helping to understand each other’s behaviour. Others (e.g., Lakin et 
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al., 2003) suggest that imitation was selected for because it can take the form of ‘social 
glue’ that helps create affiliations and to aid communication between members of a 
group (see the discussion on over-imitation above). 
Evidence for nativist accounts is derived from monkey/human neonate studies. In an 
early study, very young infants were shown to have imitated tongue protrusion, pouting, 
mouth opening movements and even sequential finger movements (Meltzoff & Moore, 
1977). One of their participants was under 45 minutes old. The authors argued that if 
infants are able to imitate within hours or days of first human contact, then this ability 
could not be based on learning, but must have arisen over our evolutionary history. 
Similar findings come from monkey neonate studies (Ferrari, Bonini & Fogassi., 2009). 
Using macaque monkeys at days one, three, seven and 14 days postpartum, Ferrari and 
colleagues compared the neonate tendency to imitate lip-smacking, tongue protrusion, 
hand opening and mouth opening. They found that three-day-old macaques imitated 
tongue protrusion and lip-smacking behaviours, clearly linking imitation to our 
evolutionary relatives.  
More recently, such nativist accounts have been challenged. For example, a meta-
analysis revisited the data on neonate imitation and found that the only imitation effect 
that was reliable was tongue protrusion (Ansfield, 1996). Other recent replication 
attempts also failed to find any evidence of infant’s ability to imitate other than tongue 
protrusion (Jones, 2006), and showed that other arousal stimuli were able to induce the 
tongue protrusion as well (e.g., mouth opening or gaze direction). Tongue protrusion by 
itself can therefore no longer be deemed as evidence for an imitative effect, and nativist 
accounts have fallen somewhat out of favour. 
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The discovery of mirror neurons is also often taken as evidence for such nativist 
accounts. As described above, mirror neurons are neurons that fire both when executing 
a particular action and when observing the same action when carried out by another 
(Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese., 2001). This apparent linkage of observed actions to 
own motor performance may therefore provide the neuronal mechanism through which 
this imitation “module” is realised in the brain (e.g. Iacoboni, 2005; Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia., 2010). More recently, several theorists have pointed out that mirror neurons, 
and the imitation they may engender, need not be a specific adaptation for social 
perception, but could be explained in terms of more domain-general learning 
mechanisms. 
Associative sequence learning (ASL) theories of automatic imitation posit that imitation 
is not innate but based on simple learned associations between motor and perceptual 
events (Ray & Heyes, 2011; Cook, Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2010). Whenever we 
carry out an action, we can observe its outcomes through our senses (e.g. visual, 
proprioceptive, auditory). The theory assumes that associations between a motor 
command and a sensory outcome are created when action events, both performance and 
observation thereof, consistently occur together such that one event predicts another 
(Heyes, 2010). For example, a child might notice that certain motor commands that it 
can send will consistently move its hand in a certain direction, and as consequence both 
motor command and perceptual consequence become associated. An important factor is 
that these associations can be made not only whilst performing an action and observing 
its consequences, but also when others’ actions that are contingent to one’s own. For 
example, one does not often observe one’s own facial expressions. However, care 
providers have a tendency to imitate the expressions simultaneously with the person 
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they are supporting, providing an alternative means of how actions and perceptual 
consequences can become linked (Ray & Heyes, 2011).  
The idea is that this coupling of actions and their perception over the lifespan is what 
caused the development of mirror neurons and the tendency to imitate others. Whenever 
we see an action of someone else, the previously established association could pre-
activate the same action in ourselves. Such a view makes specific predictions about how 
such a system could develop and be altered by experience. An associative account of 
mirror neuron function would predict that crucial to its development would be the 
synchrony in which actions and their observations occur. If incongruent pairings were to 
be repeated often enough, alternate vision-action pairings could be learned and achieve 
“counter mirroring”. As an example; the observation of a hand movement might be able 
to produce similar cortical activation as one’s own performance of foot actions, after a 
period in which these incongruent associations are consistently linked (Heyes, 2010).  
Exactly this pattern has been observed in multiple studies (e.g., Newman-Norland et al., 
2007; Ocampo, Kritikos & Cunnington, 2011). In one example (Bardi, Bundt, Notebaert 
& Brass, 2015), participants were shown clips of index or middle finger movements. In 
the congruent condition, participants were asked to make the same action as they 
observed (e.g. produce an index finger movement to the observation of an index finger 
movement). Participants in the incongruent condition, however, were asked to make the 
opposite movement (produce an index finger movement to the observation of a middle 
finger movement and vice versa). After this training period, motor evoked potentials 
were measured from the middle and index finger of the participant whilst they observed 
the same actions that they were exposed to during training. Participants that performed 
congruent actions during the training phase evoked MEPs from the congruent digit to 
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that which they observed. In contrast, those trained to make incongruent action 
responses generated MEPs in the non-imitative digit, in other words, that which they 
would have moved, not the one they had observed. Nativist accounts, which argue that 
action-perception links are innate, are unable to explain this counter-mirroring (Catmur, 
Walsh & Heyes, 2009). Instead, these and other similar studies (Wu, Evans & Adank, 
2019 (visual speech); Heyes, 2011; see Cambell & Cunnington, 2017, for a review) give 
weight to the argument that the perception of action evokes motor responses that have 
been previously associated rather than a pre-formed innate mapping (Catmur, Walsh & 
Heyes, 2007). 
A problem with both the above nativist and associationist accounts is that they can 
account very well for the forms of automatic imitation that captures the action’s 
outward forms, such as the seen body movements (e.g. Brass et al., 2000), or the 
phenomenon of over-imitation in children (e.g., Keupp, Behne & Rakoczy, 2013). 
However, it is questionable to what extent they can account for the more flexible forms 
of imitation, in which children appear to select, on the fly, which aspect of an action to 
imitate, based on their own goals or the salience of the behaviour (e.g., Gergely, 
Bekkering & Kiraly, 2002), or in which a child selects an action that achieves the same 
goal as the model, but more effectively. At least in their standard form, both nativist and 
associate sequence learning accounts appear instead to be restricted for instances in 
which a close mapping between observed and own behaviour exists on the level of the 
observable kinematics which are – either innately or through learning – linked to the 





2.2 From action simulation to action prediction and ideomotor accounts 
Simulation theories claim that automatic imitation happens as an epiphenomenon. It 
comes about because observers internally re-create – using their own motor system – 
observed actions in order to understand the behaviour of the other person (Pickering & 
Garrod, 2004; Gallese, 2007). Playing through – simulating – an action in this way may 
allow the observer insight into the feelings and intentions of their interaction partner. 
According to simulation theories, mirror neurons have evolved to make such 
simulations possible (Ferrari & Coude, 2018; Gallagher, 2015; Gallese et al., 2004). 
Accordingly, observation of an actions results in the observer’s motor system 
‘resonating’ with the observed action, as if they were currently executing the action as 
well (Rizzolatti et al, 2001). Once an action is mentally re-created in such a manner, this 
simulation can be the gateway to deriving all knowledge associated with the action, 
encompassing, perhaps, not just the outcomes of actions, but also the mental states and 
goals of the actor. Imitation, in such models therefore, happens not because a specific 
mechanism for imitation is activated, but as accidental outflow of motor activation that 
happens because observers attempt to understand (not imitate) the other person.  
Evidence for this view comes from the finding that mirror neurons, at least those so far 
recorded in macaque monkeys, only fire for goal directed actions. Thus, when a monkey 
performs or observes a goal directed action, such as grasping food, mirror neurons fire 
(Rizzolatti, 2001). If, however, the monkey observes a pantomimed action, for example 
the experimenter makes the same grasping action in the absence of food, the activation 
does not occur. The mirror neuron normally activated for the food grasping action 
remain silent (Gallese et al., 1996). For simulation theorists, this indicates that the 
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monkey did not understand the action as an instance of food grasping. Mirror neurons 
do not become activated because, in this instance, the observed action has no meaning.  
One prediction of such theories is that imitation – or activation of mirror neurons – 
should be closely linked to action understanding in human studies as well. However, 
studies which provide direct evidence for this prediction are rare. One of the few studies 
has shown that when automatic imitation of facial expressions is prevented by physical 
restraint, participants are slower to identify observed facial expressions (Stel & van 
Knippenberg, 2009). Additionally, using Botox to reduce feedback during imitation of 
emotional faces was found to attenuate amygdala activation known to be concerned 
with processing of emotional states (Hennenlotter, Dresel, Castrop, Ceballos-Baumann, 
Wohlschläger, & Haslinger, 2008). These studies therefore show that preventing 
imitation directly affects the understanding of the action, in this case of facial 
expression. 
Another prediction is that, if imitation in humans emerges from such a mechanism then 
it should – like the mirror neuron activation in monkeys – be found specifically for 
actions with clear goals. However, while some studies initially supported such a 
proposal (e.g., Longo, 2009; Bach, Bayliss & Tipper, 2011), it was not substantiated in 
a recent meta-analysis (Cracco et al., 2018). In fact, this study showed that automatic 
imitation was stronger for actions without goals. Mirror neuron activation as well as 
automatic imitation are commonly found even for goal-less actions, leading to the 
argument that the human mirror system is tuned differently than that of monkeys 
(Hickok, 2009). 
An alternative to direct action matching accounts is that of action reconstruction 
(Csibra, 2008). In this approach, motor activation during action observation follows 
20 
 
from – rather than causes – the understanding of the action, in a hierarchical, top-down 
process. Once an initial idea – or hypothesis – about an action’s goal is derived, for 
example through contextual cues such as objects (e.g., Bach, Nicholson & Hudson, 
2014) or facial expressions (Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994), the motor system tries to 
predict an action with which it could achieve this goal. By comparing this prediction to 
the action that is observed, the observer can therefore work out if the higher-level 
intention attribution was correct. Action reconstruction in this sense is therefore not an 
imitation of observable actions, but the reproduction of the observable end-states of 
predicted actions in a manner achievable by the observer (emulation rather than 
imitation, Csibra, 2008).  
Evidence for this view comes from the observation that imitation of goal directed 
actions will often bring about the same goal as the observed action but, as Gergely and 
colleagues (2002) demonstrated, not necessarily the same motor action. When infants 
observed an actor use their forehead to illuminate a light panel on a table, with the 
actor’s hands unencumbered and placed on either side of the table, they performed the 
action with the head as well. However, when the actor performed the same action, but 
could not use their hand because they were wrapped in a cloth, infants used their hands 
instead. The reason for this difference is, according to Gergely and colleagues (2002), 
that the children generally focussed on achieving the goal (turning on the light) but 
performed the action in a way that was most convenient for them. Only if the use of the 
head seems necessary for goal success – why else would an actor with their hands free 
use their head? – they copied this low-level component of the action as well. Similar 
results have now been reported in replications of this study in encultured chimpanzees 
(e.g., Buttelman et al., colleagues, 2007) and even dogs (Range, Viranyi, & Huber, 
2007).  Importantly, such findings are even seen in studies on adult automatic imitation. 
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For example, as described above, Liepelt and colleagues (2007) reported that people 
often have a tendency to respond faster with a response that matches the goal of the 
action (lifting a finger) rather than the action that was indeed observed (finger being 
held down by a clamp), as well as differentiation of the action goal from the action style 
(infants imitate action style rather than action outcome when communication renders 
style more pertinent) (Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2009) and several other studies 
provided similar findings (see Thill, Caligiore, Borghi, Ziemke, & Baldassarre, 2013 for 
a review). 
Ideomotor approaches (e.g., Greenwald, 1972; Prinz, 2005; Hommel et al., 2001; for a 
review see Shin, Proctor & Capaldi, 2010) combine ideas from associative learning 
(ASL) and action reproduction accounts. This school of thought dates back more than 
100 years and is often exemplified with William James who famously argued that 
merely thinking about an action was sufficient to cause that action to occur (James, 
1890). Following this notion, ideomotor models suggest that integrated goal-action 
representations – the anticipation of an action’s perceivable effects – are fundamental 
for the control of action.  Accordingly, any voluntary action – from complex skills such 
as performing traditional dances to simple button presses in the lab – is controlled 
through imagining the action’s perceptual consequences (Lotze, 2006).  
According to the ideomotor framework, this co-activation of both goal and motor 
components is possible because people learn – either from observation or when acting 
themselves – which body movements bring about which outcomes (in the environment 
or their own body) and associate both components, like in ASL (Heyes, 2012). In 
contrast, to ASL however, the assumption is that the resulting action representations are 
fundamentally hierarchical. They do not only encompass the lower-level (proximal) 
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consequences of an action, but the higher level (distal) ones as well. For example, one 
might learn that a certain motor command might cause the perception of one’s finger 
being depressed, but also that this finger key press might help make a room brighter, 
when it is a light switch that is being depressed. As soon as such hierarchical links 
between motor programs and low-level and high-level perceptual outcomes are 
established, it suffices to mentally activate a representation of the outcome – the effects 
one wants to achieve – and this would trigger the associated bodily movements. As a 
consequence, merely thinking of an action’s intended outcomes, can trigger its 
execution, like William James famously proposed, irrespective of whether one thinks of 
higher-level distal goals (the light coming on) or lower-level goals (a finger being 
depressed). 
Evidence for this view comes from the well-known observation that in certain 
“magical” phenomena the mere thought of an outcome suffices to produce subtle 
movements. For example, in the Ouija board, the sitters’ hands move towards the letters 
that are expected to be spelled out by a ghostly presence (Hyman, 2007), and in 
Chevreul’s magic pendulum, people involuntarily produce the swings they imagine 
(Wegner, 1994). It is also reliably demonstrated in the lab, where presentation of an 
action’s previously learned consequences suffices to bias motor output towards this 
action (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2001).  
These ideomotor models can account for both the imitation of an action’s kinematic 
features and its higher-level goals, explaining not only findings on automatic imitation 
(e.g., Wohlschläger, Gattis, & Bekkering, 2003), over-imitation in children (Whiten, 
McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009), but also goal-directed imitation 
(Massen, & Prinz, 2009). Imitation of an action’s kinematics comes about because 
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observation of these lower-level action components (e.g. seeing a finger being lifted) is 
similar to the observer’s lower-level representation of their own actions that would 
achieve the finger lift (e.g., Brass et al., 2000, 2001, 2004). They can account for goal-
directed imitation, and the flexible decision of what will be imitated: the actions higher-
level or lower-level outcomes (see Elsner, 2007, for a review). When one observes an 
action, one can generate a hierarchical action representation, simply by associating the 
observed lower-level perceptual features (e.g. pressing down with the head, as in 
Csibra’s study above) with its higher-level features (e.g. turning on the light). 
Depending on what is salient, and what is seen as relevant for one’s own goal 
achievement, the child – or the adult – can then decide what to imitate. If the action’s 
form seems important, the child just needs to re-activate the lower-level perceptual 
outcomes it has observed, and because they are linked to the motor commands that 
would achieve it, the action follows, closely matching the kinematics that were 
observed. However, if the goal is important, it could also think of the higher-level 
outcomes, leading to either the selection of the action one has just observed (pressing 
the light switch with one’s head), or, an action from one’s own repertoire that can 
achieve the same outcome more effectively (e.g. pressing the light switch with one’s 
hand).  
Ideomotor approaches can also account for both goal-directed and automatic imitation. 
They place the observable outcomes of an action – at both a high distal level and a 
lower kinematic level – at the centre stage of imitation. They can therefore naturally 
account for the outcome guidance of goal directed imitation observed in studies in 
children’s goal directed imitation (for a review, see Elsner, 2007). As described above, 
children particularly imitate actions with salient and rewarding outcomes (Hauf, Elsner, 
and Aschersleben, 2004; Corriveau, Min, Chin & Doan, 2016; Huang, Heyes & 
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Charman, 2002), they distinguish between a model’s intended and incidental outcomes 
and primarily imitate the former (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Bellagamba & 
Tomasello, 1999), and they correct observed unsuccessful actions during imitation and 
use an a more successful alternative (Meltzoff, 1995; Over & Gattis, 2010). 
A striking prediction of these ideomotor approaches is that the same outcome-guidance 
should also exist for automatic imitation. When people merely observe an action of 
another, they could similarly create an integrated action representation that links the 
proximal body movements observed to the outcomes they generate. To the extent that 
automatic imitation is guided by hierarchical action representations, it should then also 
primarily be observed for actions with positive outcomes. However, this proposal has so 
far not been tested.  
 
 
3. Thesis overview 
As the review above shows, automatic imitation and goal-directed imitation are often 
conceptualized differently and investigated on different populations (e.g. adults vs. 
children; humans vs. primates). Yet, at the same time, they share many similarities, such 
as a flexible focus on either the action’s kinematic features or the higher-level goals that 
can be achieved with these actions. This thesis is an attempt to test whether automatic 
imitation can be described in the same framework as goal-directed imitation and 




A core idea of ideomotor accounts of imitation is that, when observing another’s action, 
people can establish a hierarchical action representation that links the observed body 
movements to the ultimate outcomes they produce in the environment. While it is clear 
that such representations are established during goal-directed imitation (see Elsner, 
2007, for a review), it is not clear whether this also happens when people merely 
observe an action, without prior intention to imitate, so that it also determines automatic 
imitation. If this were the case, it would provide further evidence against bottom-up 
accounts that primarily link automatic imitation the observation of an action’s proximal 
(kinematic, body related) characteristics (e.g. nativist accounts, ASL), and support 
accounts arguing for a higher-level, hierarchical control of automatic imitation 
(ideomotor and action reproduction accounts).   
No prior studies have tested this proposal. Prior studies have only tested whether 
imitation is generally governed by top-down information, without addressing outcomes, 
and even these studies are not fully conclusive. For example, while several studies have 
manipulated the implied goals of observed action, and sometimes found that goal-
directed actions are imitated more (Liepelt, 2010; Bach et al., 2011), others have 
challenged this proposal, finding stronger effects of actions without goals (e.g. a recent 
meta-analysis, Cracco et al. 2018). Moreover, goals, per definition, are not directly 
observable. Designs therefore need to make sure that enough contextual cues are 
provided before the action so that participants attribute such goals to others, making 
control of stimuli and the attentional focus of participants difficult. Whether automatic 
imitation is controlled through a top-down process generally, and through hierarchical 
action-outcome representations in particular, is therefore still debated. 
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This thesis is an attempt to answer this question and to demonstrate that automatic 
imitation is strongly outcome-dependent, in a similar way as is observed for goal-
directed imitation. To do so, it will present a series of experiments on adult participants.  
The experiments in Chapter 2 provide a first test of whether automatic imitation is 
outcome dependent. It involves a series of experiments in which participants observe a 
simple card-game scenario whilst evaluating the outcomes of the observed actions. 
Participants were instructed to imagine that the observed hands represented their own 
hands and that they were actively taking part in the observed card-game. Responses 
required the same or different action as was observed in order to measure automatic 
imitation, as in prior studies described above. As predicted, facilitation of similar 
responses was only found for actions with positive (winning) outcomes, irrespective of 
whether participants evaluated the outcomes in terms of numerical magnitude or their 
value relative to another card, and irrespective of whether the actions were seen from a 
1st person or 3rd person perspective. It was only required that the participant evaluated 
the outcome of the acting player (not of the passive opponent). 
An open question is whether the effects in Chapter 2 indeed reflect imitation of the 
action’s kinematic or spatial properties (i.e. that they reflect more general response 
compatibility effect). Chapter 3 therefore resolved whether the outcome-dependency 
affects specifically the imitation of the action’s kinematic components, separating it 
from spatial compatibility. The experiments show actions with positive and negative 
outcomes – reaches towards and withdrawals from safe and unsafe objects – from the 
side. By varying the participants’ response assignments on a joystick, it was possible to 
counterbalance for spatial and movement compatibility. This experiment demonstrated 
that facilitation of imitative responses reflected the actions’ kinematics, not its spatial 
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properties, and that this facilitation was again determined by action outcomes. However, 
in a further iteration of the experiment the potential to imitate was removed by 
presenting non-biological stimuli: bubbles moving across the screen towards object that 
would let it safely pass or that would make it pop. This stimulus retained all the 
movement and directional information of the previous experiment but, in this case, this 
information was attributed to a simple bubble. Although this reduced the effect of 
automatic imitation overall, it also revealed that simply evaluating the action’s 
appropriateness may be enough to induce its modulation through action outcomes.  
Chapter 4 attempts to resolve the issue whether viewing actions with positive (relative 
to negative) outcomes is enough to modulate automatic imitation, even if these 
outcomes do not need to be actively evaluated. A simple interactive game was designed 
in which participants took turns to act on a touch screen making movements towards a 
target. Random variation of the outcome of this action (positive or negative) made it 
possible to test whether any differences in automatic imitation were directly linked to 
the outcome of the previously seen movement made by the interaction partner.  
Together, therefore, this thesis provides considerable evidence that automatic imitation 
is, similar to goal-directed imitation. It is guided by the outcomes of the observed 
actions, with stronger automatic imitation effects found when observing actions with 
positive outcomes. This modulation happens both when participants view actions from 
the 1st or 3rd person perspective, but it is tied to some extent, to the active evaluation of 
the observed action outcomes, and partially observed if the valence of the outcomes is 






The experiments in Chapter 2 provide a first test of whether automatic imitation can be 
described in the same framework as goal-directed imitation, and specifically whether it 
shares the dependence on the observed action outcomes. Goal-directed imitation, or 
“imitation proper”, is mostly studied in human children and primates (e.g., Call., et al 
2002; Gattis et al., 2002; Tomasello et al.,1993). As described in Chapter 1, it is 
typically seen as a top-down guided, “rational” process, in which the imitator links the 
seen body movements (the “means”) to the changes in the environment they produce 
(the “ends”) and uses this knowledge to achieve the same outcome (for a review, see 
Elsner, 2007).  
From 12 months onwards, children learn actions in such a manner. They particularly 
imitate actions that produce salient outcomes (Hauf et al., 2004; Corriveau et al., 2016; 
Huang, Heyes & Charman, 2002), they learn new action-outcome relations from 
observation (Gergely et al., 2002; Meltzoff, 1988), and during imitation, they focus 
particularly on reproducing these outcomes and check whether they are indeed achieved 
(Carpenter et al., 2005; Carpenter et al., 1998; Elsner et al., 2003). Later on, they learn 
to distinguish between a model’s intended and incidental outcomes and primarily 
imitate the former (Carpenter et al., 1998; Bellagamba et al., 1999), they correct 
observed unsuccessful actions during imitation (Meltzoff, 1995; Over et al., 2010), and 
they readily use different body movements, should they allow them to achieve the 
outcome more effectively (Tomasello, 1996; Gergely et al., 2002; Buttelmann et al., 
2007; but see Over et al., 2012, for evidence on over-imitation). 
In sharp contrast, automatic imitation reflects the tendency to non-strategically and non-
intentionally copy the gestures, body language, accent, posture and facial expressions of 
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one’s interaction partners. It is observed in everyday interactions (Chartrand et al., 
1999) and in the lab, where participants execute responses more quickly if they match 
an action they have just observed (e.g., Heyes, 2011; Brass et al., 2002; Bach et al., 
2007; Bach et al., 2007; Catmur et al., 2011; Bertenthal et al., 2006). In contrast to goal-
directed imitation, automatic imitation is assumed to be primarily bottom-up driven, 
resulting from a simple matching of observed body movements to participants’ own 
motor programmes. It has been suggested that automatic imitation is mediated by a 
specifically evolved “mirror” system (Iacaboni, Woods, Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta & 
Rizzolatti, 1999; Iacoboni, 2009) or by sensorimotor associations between correlated 
motoric and sensory action components (e.g., Heyes, 2011; Catmur et al., 2009; 
Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001; Van der Wel, Knoblich & Sebanz, 
2013). And while automatic imitation is modulated by liking and perceived similarity of 
the model (e.g., Wang & Hamilton, 2012; Leighton, Bird, Orsini & Heyes, 2010), it is 
widely assumed to occur automatically, without top-down control (Rizzolatti & Fogassi, 
2014), even when attention is directed away from the observed action (Brass et al., 
2000; but see Bach et al., 2008) and under both low and high perceptual load (Catmur, 
2015; Ramsey, Darda & Downing, 2019). Theorists have therefore described it as 
“unintentional” (Richardson et al., 2007), “unconscious” or “non-conscious” (Belot et 
al., 2012; van Baren et al., 2003), or, indeed, “automatic” (Obhi et al., 2013; Heyes, 
2011). 
The experiments in this chapter are intended to provide a challenge to this view. They 
provide a first test of whether automatic imitation, as it is measured in response time 
tasks in the lab, is similarly outcome-driven as goal-directed imitation. This argument 
follows from ideomotor or hierarchical/predictive models of action (e.g., Hommel et al., 
2001; Adams, Shipp & Friston, 2013; Grafton & Hamilton, 2007). These models argue 
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that the representations that humans use to control their own behaviour – and 
understand the behaviour of others – are inherently hierarchical. They are assumed to 
link an action’s lower-level body movements – the action’s more proximal components 
or “means” – to their ultimate effects: the action’s consequences, or “ends”, both within 
the environment and on one’s own body or affective responses. Goal-directed imitation, 
in such models, is possible, because whenever people observe an action, they establish 
such an integrated representation, associating the observed body movements to the 
observed outcomes (Wohlschläger et al., 2003; Hommel et al. 2001; Gergely & Csibra, 
2003). From this point onwards, observers only need to activate the higher-level 
“outcome” components to trigger activation of the lower-level bodily components to 
imitate the behaviour and achieve the same outcome, and this should happen primarily 
when these outcomes are desirable (see Elsner, 2007, for review and extended 
argument). The crucial insight of these models is that automatic imitation could rely on 
the same representations (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Van der Wel, et al., 2013). Simply 
observing others’ actions could be enough to generate such hierarchical means-end 
representations. Own actions would then be executed more quickly not only when they 
match the seen action’s more proximal, kinematic components, but specifically when 
their observed outcomes are positive and match one’s own goals.  
The review of the literature in the Introduction has shown that this proposal has so far 
not been directly tested. However, several recent studies provide more general evidence 
for top-down control also in automatic imitation (see Campbell & Cunnington, 2017, 
for a review). For example, Liepelt et al., (2008) reported that people imitate the 
inferred goal of an action (intending to lift a finger) rather than what is actually 
observed (finger held in place by a clamp). Similarly, studies in adults as well as 
children have shown that people imitate actions more quickly if they are directed 
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towards an object (i.e. a dot on a table) rather than to empty space (Wohlschläger et al., 
2003), especially if these actions are appropriate for successful interaction with this 
object (e.g., Bach et al., 2008). While such findings are typically explained in terms of 
the object-centeredness of the human mirror network (e.g., Bach, Nicholson & Hudson, 
2014; Wohlschläger & Bekkering, 2002), they could equally reflect the representation 
of observed or anticipated achievement of action outcomes (i.e. the successful reaching 
of the action targets).  
The experiments in this chapter directly test whether automatic imitation is driven by 
the observed action outcomes. Four experiments independently manipulated (1) the 
observed action outcomes (positive vs negative) and (2) the match of the observed 
actions to the participants’ own responses (matching vs mismatching). They were 
designed analogously to experiments in children in which they particularly imitate 
actions that are successful or have positive outcomes and, if anything, correct 
unsuccessful attempts towards more effective alternatives (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2016; 
Carpenter et al., 1998; Meltzoff, 1995; Over et al., 2010). In the studies in the current 
chapter, adult participants watched simple reaches with the left or right hand that either 
revealed winning or losing cards in a card game (relative to a previously displayed card 
on a table). They judged these actions – did the player win or lose? – by making a 
left/right response that therefore either matched or mismatched the observed actions. It 
was measured whether these responses would be executed more quickly if they matched 
the just observed actions, particularly when these actions had positive outcomes (wins 
in the card game), but not for negative outcomes (losses). Such results would reveal 
close links between automatic imitation and goal-directed imitation and would support 
hierarchical models of action control, in which action observation and execution are 
driven by action representation that link proximal action properties to their distal action 
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The aim of Experiment 1a was to provide a first test of whether automatic imitation is 
modulated by the outcome of the observed action. Participants observed simple actions 
in a game of cards. In each trial, an actor used their left or right hand to reach towards – 
and reveal – a left or right card on the table directly in front of them. The chosen card 
was then revealed to have either won or lost, depending on whether the card was higher 
or lower than a previously revealed opponent’s card. Participants simply reported which 
type of outcome they observed (winning or losing) using a left or right key press, which 
therefore either matched the observed actor’s left/right action or mismatched this action.  
This design provides a first test (1) of whether automatic imitation is elicited in such a 
setting and (2) whether it depends on the observed action’s outcome, that is, whether the 
observed action revealed a winning or losing card. We should then find automatic 
imitation – faster and more accurate responses that match the just seen action – 
specifically for observed actions with a positive outcome. Note that in this setup, the 
observed body movements are identical: the only aspect that differs is the outcome 
revealed by the action, which was not part of the action and statistically independent of 
which action was executed. Finding that automatic imitation depends on the action’s 
outcome would therefore provide direct evidence that observers establish hierarchical 
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action-outcome representations whenever they see others’ act and that they rely on these 






41 participants took part in the experiment (age range from 18 to 45, mean age = 27, 7 
males, 5 left-handed). They were recruited by the Plymouth University, School of 
Psychology participation system, which includes (non-academic) staff, students and 
members of the public. Participants were given a cash reward of £4 or course credit for 
participation. They were given an information sheet, which explained the experiment 
and procedure, as well as their right to withdraw at any time, and gave informed written 
consent. No personally identifying information was collected or retained. Following the 
experiment, participants were fully debriefed in writing, and allowed the opportunity to 
ask questions as well as being given contact details for any further queries they may 
have. The experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee of Plymouth University.  
Four participants were excluded from analysis for making more than 20% errors. Two 
additional participants were removed because they were current PhD students and not 
naïve to the purpose of the experiment. As these participants showed the predicted 
pattern to a stronger extent than usual, their removal did not affect the pattern of results. 
A sensitivity analysis with G*Power showed that the final sample size of 35 
provides .80 power to detect interaction effects with Cohen’s d = .49. A typical example 
34 
 
of a similar study testing links between SRC and valance shows an interaction effect 
size of F (2, 42) = 26.07, p<.001, Cohen’s d = .55 (Xiaojun, Xuqun, Changxiu, Shuoqiu, 
& Chaoyi, 2014). Another example of the effect sizes expected taken from an automatic 
imitation SRC study, with similar trial numbers, shows an interaction effect size of F(1, 
18) = 21.9, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .54 (Klapper, Ramsey, Wigboldus, & Cross, 2014) 
confirming that expected effect sizes are in this range.  
Apparatus and stimuli  
The experiment was conducted in a laboratory room with participants seated in separate 
sound proofed cubicles. The stimuli consisted of video clips presented on a 21 inch 
monitor positioned at approximately shoulder height, 60 cm away from participants, 
with a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. Stimulus presentation was controlled by Eprime 
2.0. Participants responded to the stimuli using a keyboard by pressing either a button 
on the right with their right index finger or a button on the left with their left index 
finger. Buttons were colour coded (yellow and blue) rather than being assigned a 
left/right or numerical identifier.   
The stimuli were recorded with a Sony DCR-TRV900E camcorder fixed to a tripod. 
The camcorder was arranged directly above the actor and pointed downwards over the 
actor’s hands at a position that was as similar as possible to the actor’s own visual 
perspective. Two five-frame action sequences were created in this way, showing either 
the left or right hand moving forward and pointing towards a left or right card on the 
table in front of it (see Figure 1). The pointing action was chosen because it was similar 
as possible to the participant’s key press. The first frame, displayed for 750 ms, showed 
the actor’s hands in resting state at the edge of the screen with the three cards above, the 
top (the opponent) card face up, showing one of eight possible numbers (2-9). The next 
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two frames, each presented for 50 ms, then showed the actor reaching forward and 
pointing, with either the left or right hand, towards one of the two cards, without 
obstructing their view. The last stage of the movement, frame 4, was seen for longer (up 
to 5000 ms. or the participant made a response) to make clear that the movement had 
stopped. It showed the card that the actor pointed towards face up, again revealing either 
one of eight numbers (1-10), selected so that the revealed number would in half of the 
cases be larger than the number of the first case and lower than the other half (see Table 
1a). 
Sixteen such action sequences were created for each hand, showing the different 
combinations of symbols on the player’s and opponent’s cards, such that either the 
player or the opponent was equally likely to win (see figure 1 for an example). No 
draws were shown (see table 1).  
 
 
Figure 1a: An example of a stimulus sequence, showing a higher (“winning”) outcome. 
 
Table 1a: Combinations of farthest card and revealed 
card 
                
Farthest card number  2 
 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
Left Hand Card Revealed  1 3 2 4 3 5 4 6 5 7 6 8 7 9 8 10 





Procedure and Design  
Participants were asked to imagine that the stimulus hands were their own, and to judge, 
in each trial, whether they won or lost in a card game. Each trial started with a hand in 
resting position at the bottom of the screen, with three cards in front of it (Figure 1a). 
The farthest card was already revealed – showing one of the numbers 1-8 – and referred 
to as the opponent’s card. The hand then reached forward and revealed one of the two 
other cards – the player cards –, which would show either a number higher or one 
number lower than the ‘opponent’s’ card. Participants judged - through the press of one 
of two buttons with their left or right hand (counterbalanced between participants) – 
whether this card won (was higher) or lost (was lower) against the already revealed 
card.  
Each participant completed two blocks. Odd-numbered participants completed the first 
block such that a left response indicated a loss and a right response a win, while this 
assignment was reversed for the second block. Even numbered participants completed 
the reverse assignments. There were 224 experimental trials per block (448 in 
total). Each trial was randomly selected (without replacement) from each of the 32 
stimuli and repeated 7 times within each block. It was varied whether the reach of the 
actor would need to be imitated by the participant to make their response (e.g., both the 
actor and the participant used left hands) or not (e.g., the actor used their left hand and 
the participant used the right hand) and whether the observed action produced a positive 
or negative outcome (i.e. revealed a winning or losing card). Prior to the experiment, 





Trials were excluded when RTs were faster than 100 ms. or slower than 5000 ms. and 
when beyond 3 standard deviations from the mean of their respective win/loss condition 
(2.2%). The remaining data were analysed with a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA, with 
the factors Compatibility (whether the participants’ action was compatible or 
incompatible with the just observed action) and Outcome (whether the observed action 
revealed a winning or losing card). The analysis of response times (Figure 2a) revealed 
a main effect of Outcome, F(1, 34) = 5.74, p= .022, η2= .144, with participants 
identifying wins faster than losses. There was no main effect of Compatibility F(1, 34) 
= 3.28, p= .079, η2= .088, but the analysis revealed the predicted interaction of 
Compatibility and Outcome, F(1, 34) = 10.42, p= .003, η2 = .235. Paired-samples t-test 
showed, as predicted, that the RT advantage of compatible actions was only present for 
winning actions, t(34)=3.650, p=.001, and numerically reversed for losing actions, t < 1. 
The same ANOVA on the Error rates did not reveal any main effects or interactions (for 







Figure 2a: Response times (top) and Error Rates (bottom) in Experiment 1a. The left 
bars reflect responses in which the actor’s reach revealed a winning (higher) card and 
the bars on the right reflect responses in which it revealed a losing (lower card). The 
black bars show responses times for matching button presses (on the same side as the 
just observed action) and grey bars show response times for non-matching actions (on 






This study provided a first test of whether the outcome of an observed action affects 
automatic imitation. Participants watched an actor whose actions revealed winning or 
losing cards in a card game and evaluated these outcomes with responses that either 
matched or mismatched the just observed actions. The results showed, first, that 
participants’ responses were faster when they matched the observed action, confirming 
that this paradigm captures the expected automatic imitation effect (e.g., Heyes, 2011; 
Brass et al., 2002; Bach & Tipper, 2007; Bach, Peatfield & Tipper, 2007). In addition, 
and more importantly, we found that action observation facilitated similar responses 
only if the action had a positive outcome, in the present case, when it produced a win in 
a game. Observing a losing action elicited no such effect, and did, if anything, slow 
down participants’ ability to produce a matching compared to a non-matching action.  
This finding provides a first indication that automatic imitation – at least in our 
paradigm – cannot simply be attributed to a simple matching of observed actions to 
one’s own action repertoires. Instead, outcome information must have been integrated 
into the action’s representation and directly affected whether it would be imitated. This 
finding is striking because in our game the outcome is not part of the motor act itself; it 
is an incidental consequence of which card is revealed by this act. Moreover, outcomes 
were not statistically linked to which action was executed but were randomly selected 
(i.e. both outcomes occurred equally for both actions). The finding that action outcome 
nevertheless affected automatic imitation indicates that it is guided not only by motoric- 
or goal representations linked to a motor act itself. Instead, it must draw upon higher-
level representations that integrate this motor act into a hierarchical representation that 
also includes the action’s value in terms of the distal (not body-related) outcomes it 
40 
 
produced (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Adams, Shipp & Friston, 2013; Grafton & 
Hamilton, 2007). 
One potential problem with Experiment 1a may be that the numerical value of the card 
might have influenced responses rather than the positive or negative outcomes. 
Numerical representations might have a special status in cognitive processing (Cohen 
Kadosh, Lammertyn, & Izard, 2008), are given magnitude automatically (Girelli, 
Lucandeli, & Butterworth, 2000) and might produce compatibility effects themselves 
(for example: SNARC effect, Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; see Fischer, 2003). 
Whilst the game depicted in the stimuli is an ecologically valid representation of a card 
game, it is therefore nevertheless possible that the effect observed may have occurred 
due to the presentation of number, particularly given that the task required participants 
to find a larger number than the opponent’s, and positive outcomes went together with 
higher value cards than negative outcomes. The effect could therefore, at least in part, 
be due to the numerical values of the cards, not the outcomes themselves. Experiment 





Experiment 2a attempted to disentangle the modulation of automatic imitation through 
outcome information from its modulation through card magnitude alone. In Experiment 
2a, we therefore varied how higher or lower cards had to be interpreted by participants. 
In different groups, we varied whether participants were told that: (1) higher card 
numbers would win (as in Experiment 1a), that (2) higher cards would lose and that 
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lower numbers would win, or (3) to make no valence judgments, but to simply evaluate 
if the second card was numerically higher or lower than the previous one.  
If the modulation of automatic imitation was driven by the magnitude of the numbers 
presented on the stimuli, rather than the actual outcome in terms of game wins or losses, 
then each of the three groups should produce the same pattern of results: automatic 
imitation should be found for cards that are of higher magnitude than the opponent card, 
irrespective of instruction. In contrast, if in the previous experiments, the modulation of 
automatic imitation was driven by the evaluation of action outcomes, then the pattern 
should differ across the three experimental groups. In other words, higher value cards 
should induce automatic imitation in the group in which higher cards, but not in the no-
valence group. The group in which lower cards won should show the opposite pattern, 





84 participants took part in the experiment (age range from 18 to 38, mean age = 26, 7 
males, 5 left-handed), recruited as in Experiment 1. The final sample of 75 (after 
exclusion, see below) was split into three equal-sized groups. Power was assessed using 
G*Power. For the individual groups of 25 this provides .8 power to detect an effect size 




Apparatus and stimuli 
Apparatus and stimuli were identical to Experiment 1, with the exception of the three 
sets of instructions provided for the participants.  
 
Procedure and design 
As before, participants were asked to imagine that the hands they observed were their 
own, and that they were playing a card game. Thus, the farthest card against which they 
would make a judgement was referred to as the “opponent’s” card. Participants were 
instructed to respond according to whether a player won or lost in two of the conditions 
using one of the pre-specified rules: (1) to win, your card must be higher than the 
opponent’s; (2) to win your card must be lower than the opponent’s card. In a third 
control condition, (3) participants were simply asked to respond as top whether their 
card was higher or lower than the opponent’s card. All other aspects of procedure and 




Nine participants were removed from the analysis for failing to meet an accuracy 
threshold of 80%. Analysis was conducted on the 75 successful participant recordings. 
As in Experiment 1a, individual trials were discarded when RTs were faster than 100 
ms. or slower than 5000 ms. and when beyond 3 standard deviations from the mean of 
their respective win/loss condition (2.43%). 
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The response time data (Figure 4, upper panel) was analysed with a three-factor analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) with the within-subjects’ factors Compatibility (whether the 
required response matched the observed action or not), Magnitude (whether the revealed 
card was higher or lower than the opponent card), and the between factor of Instruction 
(higher wins, no valence, lower wins). The analysis revealed no main effects of 
Magnitude, F(1, 72) = .88, p= .35, and only a marginally significant main effect of 
Compatibility, F(1, 72) = 2.15, p= .09, η2 = .04, reflecting the general automatic 
imitation effect. Compatibility and Magnitude interacted, F(1, 72) = 21.95, p < .001, η2 
= .23. Step-down analysis with paired samples t-tests revealed a general (i.e. across 
groups) RT advantage for responses that matched the observed actions, specifically 
when responding to higher value cards, t(74)=2.19, p=.03, but not when responding to 
lower value cards, t(74)=1.49, p=.14. There was no interaction of Magnitude, Imitation 
and Instruction, F(2, 72) = 1.948, p= .15, η2 = .05. While the expected pattern was seen 
numerically (see Figure 3), with larger modulation of automatic imitation in the Higher-
wins group than the No-valence and Lower-wins group, the pairwise differences 
between the groups were not significant (p > .28, for all), and the interaction of 






Figure 3a: Response times in Experiment 2a, showing the data from the three participants 
groups from left to right (Lower Wins, No Valance, Higher Wins). Within each group, the left 
two bars reflect responses in which the actor’s reach revealed a higher card and the bars on the 
right reflect responses in which it revealed a lower card that the opponent card. The black bars 
show responses times for compatible button presses (on the same side as the just observed 
action) and grey bars show response times for incompatible button presses (on the opposite side 
as the just seen action). Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
The same ANOVA was conducted on the error rates (Figure 3, lower panel), but did not 




The aim of Experiment 2a was to test whether numerical magnitude contributed to the 
modulation of automatic imitation times in Experiment 1a, and to disentangle this 
contribution from that of the outcome (win/lose) evaluations. The results in the 
participant group for whom higher cards won and lower cards lost replicated 
Experiment 1a in terms of automatic imitation being present only when higher cards 
were being played, but not when losing cards were played. Strikingly, however, while 
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this modulation was numerically larger in this group, it did not differ statistically in the 
other two groups of participants. Indeed, the modulation of automatic imitation through 
card values was present in both others participant groups. Higher value cards elicited 
stronger automatic imitation effects compared to lower value cards, even when no 
valence was assigned to card magnitude, and even if higher cards had to be interpreted 
as losing cards.  
These data suggest that the outcome modulation observed in Experiment 1a could be 
due to, at least in part, the numerical values of the cards, which give rise to automatic 
imitation for high value cards and eliminate automatic imitation for low value cards. 
This is a surprising – and to my knowledge – novel finding, which implies that card 
value itself may be coded in a valenced way that evaluates higher-value cards more 
positively than lower-value cards, and that this cancels out any additional influence of 
the outcomes cognitive evaluation in terms of winning or losing. Of course, card 
magnitude is itself an action-external action outcome, so this finding does not 
undermine the general proposal of an outcome modulation of automatic imitation. 
Nevertheless, this potential influence is avoided in the following studies reported in this 
chapter, by exchanging the magnitude decisions for symbolic judgments based on the 
rules of the game rock-paper-scissors. In doing so the experiment directly tests whether 
automatic imitation depends on the conceptual representation of the observed action’s 








This experiment tested whether imitation is guided by the outcome of the observed 
action but does so using symbols that have no magnitude information. To do so, we 
used the same card game as in Experiments 1a and 2a, but replaced the numbers with 
the well-known symbols of Rock-Paper-Scissors. The initial “opponent” card revealed 
one of these symbols, and the “player” card revealed by the observed action showed 
another of these symbols, which could win or lose against the first card following the 
well-known rules of Rock-Paper-Scissors (paper beats rock, rock beats scissors, scissors 
beat paper). As in the previous experiments, participants were asked to identify whether 
they saw a winning or losing outcome by making a left or right key press, which either 
matched (using the same hand) or mismatched the action they just observed (using a 
different hand).  
If Experiment 3a replicates that outcomes modulate automatic imitation, it would solve 
the problem of numerical magnitudes contaminating the results and automatically 
guiding automatic imitation. The symbols used do not hold intrinsic value. They cannot 
be assigned a numerical value, nor can a decision be made about whether a particular 
symbol is positive or negative when presented individually. The outcome of the action 
can only be resolved when the symbol on the player card is evaluated against the 
opponent card, providing a “pure” measure of action outcome, and whether it affects 
automatic imitation. If so, then the participants’ own responses should again the be 







35 participants (age range from 18 to 45, mean age = 28, 8 males, 2 left handed), all 
members of the public and recruited through the Plymouth University, School of 
Psychology participation system, took part in the experiment, in exchange for a cash 
reward of £4. Five of these participants were excluded for making more than 20% 
errors. Participants were fully briefed and debriefed and gave informed consent, in 
accordance with the ethical guidance of Plymouth University and the Declaration of 
Helsinki. The resulting total sample size of 30 provides .80 power to detect interaction 
effects with Cohen’s d = .46.  
 
Apparatus and stimuli 
Apparatus and stimuli were created in the same way as Experiment 1a and 2a with the 
exception that the background of the stimuli was removed and replaced with a black 
screen. Additionally, instead of numerical symbols, an image of rock, paper or scissors 
was presented in the centre of the card (Figure 4). To present a smoother action, the 
movement sequence was subdivided in three rather than four frames of 50 ms. 
Moreover, a small delay of 500 ms. was introduced between the finger reaching the 




Figure 4a: An example of an experimental stimulus set using a right hand, when the 
opponent’s card was ‘paper’ and the participant’s card was ‘rock’. 
 
Six combinations of stimuli sets were created for each hand producing 12 in total; note 
that no draws were shown, outcomes were either positive or negative and none of the 
games showed a draw (Table 2).  
 
Table 2a: Combinations of farthest (opponent’s) card and revealed (participant’s) card 
Opponent’s Card Rock  Paper  Scissors  
Left Hand Card Paper Scissors Scissors Rock Rock Paper 
Right Hand Card Scissors Paper Rock Scissors Paper Rock 
 
 
Procedure and Design.  
Participants were asked to imagine that the hands they observed in the stimuli were their 
own, and that they were playing a card game. The farthest card against which they 
would make a judgement was referred to as the “opponent’s” card. Participants were 
instructed to respond according to whether a player won or lost using the pre-specified 
rules – rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper and paper beats rock. They completed 
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ten practice trials prior to the experiment, randomly selected from the experimental 
stimuli. The experiment was divided into two blocks. Odd numbered participants 
completed the experiment with right button for winning and left button for losing, 
whilst the even numbered participants completed the experiment with reverse hand 
mapping. Each block of trials consisted of random without replacement selection for 
each of the twelve stimuli which was repeated thirteen times within each block. This 
resulted in 156 experimental trials per block, with 312 in total for each participant. All 
other aspects of procedure and design as well as data recording and analysis were 
identical to Experiment 1. 
 
Results 
Trials were excluded when RTs were faster than 100 ms. or slower than 5000 ms. and 
when beyond 3 standard deviations from the mean of the respective win/loss condition 
(3.0%). Response times were analysed with a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA, with the 
factors Compatibility (whether the side of the participants’ action matched or 
mismatched the observed action) and Outcome (whether the observed action revealed a 
winning or losing card). The analysis (Figure 2) revealed a main effect of Imitation, 
F(1, 29) = 9.22, p = .005, η2 = .241, and of Outcome, F(1, 29) = 42.85, p < .001, η2 
= .596. Participants generally responded more rapidly to wins than to losses and when 
their responses matched the action they just observed, replicating the expected 
automatic imitation effect. Importantly, as in Experiment 1, Imitation and Outcome 
interacted, F(1, 29) = 13.57, p = .001, η2 = .319. Follow up t-tests revealed that after 
observing winning actions, compatible responses were faster than incompatible 
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responses, t(29) = 4.66, p < .001, but no such effect was observed for losing actions, 
t(29) = 1.02, p = .316.  
The same ANOVA run on the error rates only revealed theoretically uninteresting main 
effects of Outcome, F(1, 29) = 4.35, p = .046, η2 = .130, and neither a main effect of 









Figure 5a: Response times in Experiment 3a. The left bars reflect responses in which the 
actor’s reach revealed a winning card and the bars on the right reflect responses in which it 
revealed a losing card. The black bars show responses times for matching button presses (on the 
same side as the just observed action) and grey bars show response times for non-matching 






Experiment 3a again replicated the automatic imitation effect (e.g., Heyes, 2011; Brass 
et al., 2002; Bach & Tipper, 2007; Bach, Peatfield & Tipper, 2007), with participants 
responding more quickly when their response was similar to the action they had just 
observed, compared to when their responses was more dissimilar to this action. In 
addition, and more importantly, Experiment 3a showed again that – as in the previous 
two experiments in this chapter – automatic imitation is modulated by the outcome of 
the observed action. The response time advantage for matching actions was only 
observed for actions with winning (positive) outcomes, not for losing actions (negative 
outcomes). This was the case even though the action outcomes were not established by 
comparisons of the cards’ intrinsic (numerical) magnitudes, but through comparisons of 
the not-magnitude-related symbols on the player and opponent card, according to the 
rules of the game Paper-Scissors-Rock.  
The results therefore confirm that the evaluation of the action outcome itself, as either 
positive or negative, can modulate automatic imitation, eliciting a tendency to perform 
the same action as the model when the observed outcome is positive, but not when 
negative. These findings are not consistent with idea that automatic imitation results 
from a simple kinematic matching of observed actions to ones’ own motor repertoire 
(Heyes, 2011; Iacaboni et al., 1999; Iacoboni, 2009), for which such distal (non-action-
related) outcomes would not matter. They favour hierarchical models of action 
observation and control, in which action observation establishes integrated 
representations that include not only the observed motor act but also the outcome it 
produces, which then guides overt behaviour, similarly to findings in goal-directed 
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imitation in children and primates (e.g., Elsner, 2007; Hommel et al., 2001; Call, et al., 
2002; Gattis et al., 2002).  
One aspect of the present design limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
present results. First, in all experiments so far, participants were asked to imagine that 
the hands in the scene were seen from a 1st person perspective. While previous studies 
have revealed little distinction between the imitation of 1st person and 3rd person actions 
(Cracco et al., 2018), this raises the question whether our effects indeed reflect 
automatic imitation, which reflects, by definition, the copying of an action of another 
person, or whether the egocentric viewpoint might have caused participants to encode 
the action’s outcome to a stronger extent than they otherwise would have. If we are to 
truly investigate whether imitation is affected by outcome information, we also need to 





Experiment 4a addressed two potential alternative explanations for the present results. 
First, in Experiments 1a to 3a, participants always saw the actions from a first-person 
perspective, as if the hands were their own. While previous studies have revealed that 
mimicry in everyday social interactions can be affected by perspective (Genschow, 
Florack, & Wänke, 2013), automatic imitation appears to reflect different processes 
(Genschow, et al., 2017) and there is indeed little distinction between automatic 
imitation of actions seen from 1st person and 3rd person perspectives (e.g., Bertenthal, 
Longo & Kosobud, 2006; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006), even when tested using 
meta-analytic measures (Cracco et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the stimulus presentation 
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from the 1st person perspective in the previous experiments raises the question whether 
the effects are perhaps better explained as spontaneous motor responses resulting from 
the body parts mapped to one’s own body (e.g., Ramsey, Cumming, Eastough & 
Edwards, 2010). Experiment 1d therefore replicates Experiment 1c but varies, between 
participants to avoid carry-over effects, whether the actions are seen from a 1st person 
perspective or a 3rd person perspective. If the outcome-dependence seen in Experiment 
1a and 3a indeed reflects automatic imitation, then it should be observed in both 
viewing perspectives. 
A second question is whether the observed modulation of automatic imitation indeed 
reflects – as we hypothesized – the integration of (positive or negative) outcomes with 
the action that was observed, into a combined action representation. One way to test this 
is to decouple participants’ outcome evaluation from the observed action. Orthogonal to 
the perspective manipulation, we therefore gave half of the participants the same task as 
before, judging whether the actor’s actions caused them to win or lose. This group 
should replicate the effects of Experiment 1a and Experiment 3a. The other half, 
however, was instructed to take the perspective of the opponent, whose card was 
revealed from the outset, and to judge whether the action of the other player caused 
them to win or lose. This subtle shift in instruction keeps the type of response and the 
requirement for outcome evaluation identical as well as the presented stimuli. 
Moreover, as before, this judgment requires attention towards the observed action and 
how the card it reveals relates to the previously revealed (own) card. The only 
difference is therefore that the to-be-evaluated action outcome was not linked to the 
actor that produced it, but to the other, non-acting player.  
In Experiment 4a, there were therefore four groups of participants. They all performed 
the same general task but we varied orthogonally (1) whether the actions were seen 
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from a 1st person perspective or a 3rd person perspective, and (2) whether participants 
judged how the action’s outcome affected the player that had produced this outcome or 





120 participants took part (age range from 19 to 39, mean age = 24, 32 male, 10 left 
handed), selected as in the previous experiments. Ten participants were excluded 
because they made more than 20% errors. Six additional participants were not 
considered for analysis due to experimenter error. Analysis was conducted on the 104 
remaining participants, with at least 25 participants in each of the four groups of 
participants (1st person player, 1st person opponent, 3rd person player, 3rd person 
opponent). Assuming that the between-group manipulation would eliminate or reverse 
the effect of previous study, the total sample size of 104 post exclusion provides .80 
power to detect interaction effect sizes with Cohen’s d = .28, and group differences of d 
= .57 (based on split-half main effect and interaction contrasts). 
 
Procedure and design  
The procedure was identical to Experiment 3a. However, now, half of the participants 
were shown the actions from a 1st person perspective, whilst the other half showed 
them in 3rd person perspective. Orthogonal to that manipulation, half of the participants 
were asked to imagine that the hands they observed were their own hands and judged 
whether “they” won or lost. The other half were asked to imagine that the moving hands 
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were the “opponent’s” hands, and they judged whether they themselves won or lost (for 
differences see table 3). All other aspects of the experiments were identical across 
conditions.  
 
Figure 6a. Example stimulus sequences in Experiment 4, showing the same action seen 
from a 1st person perspective (upper panels) and 3rd person perspective (lower panels).  
 
 
Apparatus, Stimuli and Procedure 
Apparatus and stimuli were identical to previous experiments, with the exception that 
the action sequences were mirrored along the horizontal axis. In addition, labels and 
items on the cards were exchanged for ones that looked equal in both perspectives, 
ensuring that identification difficulty does not differ between perspectives (see Figure 
6). 
Participants had the same task as before. They first saw a revealed card and then a left 
or right reach towards one of two other cards, which caused this card to be revealed. 
They judged whether this newly revealed card caused them to win or lose the game, by 
either judging taking the perspective of the player or the opponent. In both conditions, 




Table a: Instructions 1 given to half of the participants in 1st & 3rd person perspective 
condition and instructions 2 given to half the participants in 1st and 3rd person 
perspective conditions. 
Instruction 1: Imagine you are the 
actor 
Instruction 2: Imagine the actor is an 
opponent 
You are playing a card game against an 
opponent. 
You will see three cards on the table. 
One of them is face up.  
This is the OPPONENT'S card 
You will see a player point to and 
choose a card. This is YOUR card. 
If you can, try to imagine that the hands 
are your own. 
You have to decide if YOUR card beats 
THEIR card or not. 
You are playing a card game against an 
opponent. 
You will see three cards on the table. 
One of them is face up.  
This is YOUR card 
You will see the opponent point to and 
choose a card. 
You have to decide if YOUR card beats 
their card or not. 
 
Each block of trials consisted of random without replacement selection for each of the 
twelve stimuli which was repeated thirteen times within each block. This resulted in 156 





As in all previous experiments, trials were excluded when they were faster than 100ms 
or slower than 5000 ms, and if they fell outside 3 standard deviations of the mean (3%). 
The remaining data (Figure 4) was analysed with a four factor ANOVA with the within-
participant factors Compatibility (whether the response was compatible to the seen 
action or not) and Outcome (whether the observed action revealed a winning or losing 
card), and the between-participant factors Perspective (whether the actions were seen 
from a 1st or 3rd person perspective) and Target (whether participants judged the 
outcomes for the actor or the not-acting opponent). The analysis of response times 
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(Figure 4) revealed a main effect of Outcome, F(1, 100) = 143.48, p < .001, η2 = .59, 
which interacted with Perspective, F(1, 100) = 7.78, p = .006, η2 = .07, and Target, F(1, 
100) = 18.12, p < .001, η2 = .153. Participants identified wins faster than losses, 
specifically when seeing actions from the 1st person perspective and when taking the 
opponent’s point of view. Replicating Experiment 1, there was only a marginal main 
effect of Compatibility, F(1, 100) = 2.90, p = .092, η2 = .028, as well as the predicted 
interaction of Compatibility and Outcome, F(1, 100) = 11.73, p < .001, η2 = .11. As 
before, the response time benefit for matching actions was seen for actions with positive 
outcomes (wins, t(103) = 1.74, p = .085), and reversed for those with negative outcomes 
(losses, t(103) = 3.53, p = .001). Importantly, the interaction of Compatibility and 
Outcome was qualified further by an interaction with Target, F(1, 100) = 9.22, p = .003, 
η2 = .084, but not Perspective, F < 1. The outcome modulation of automatic imitation 
was present when participants judged action outcomes for the actor F(1, 100) = 18.07, p 
< .001, η2 = .258, but absent when judging the outcomes for the opponent F < 1. Indeed, 
for participants judging outcomes for the actor, the relevant interaction of Outcome and 
Compatibility was present both when they saw the actions from a 1st person 
perspective, F(1, 25) = 5.11, p = .033, η2 = .170, and when they saw them from a 3rd 
person perspective F(1,27) = 14.09, p = .001, η2 =.34. When judging the outcomes for 
the opponent, the interaction was absent in both perspectives (both, F < 1).  
The same ANOVA was conducted on the error rates (figure 5), but this did not reveal 
any theoretically interesting effects, other than a marginally significant interaction of 
Outcome and Compatibility, F(1, 25) = 3.44, p = .067, η2 = .033. For winning actions, 
participants made more errors for matching rather than non-matching actions, t(103) = 








Figure 7a. Response times in Experiment 2, depending on whether the participant 
evaluated the player’s actions (upper panels) or the opponent’s actions (lower panel) 
and on whether participants saw the actions from a 1st person perspective (left panels) 
or 3rd person perspective (right panels). In each panel, the left bars reflect responses 
in which the actor’s reach revealed a winning (higher) card and the bars on the right 
reflect responses in which it revealed a losing (lower) card. The black bars show 
responses times for compatible button presses and white bars show response times for 




Experiment 4a replicated the outcome-dependency of automatic imitation first 
demonstrated in Experiments 1a and 3a. As before, the benefit of responding with a 
compatible response depended on the observed action’s outcome. While the response 
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time advantage of compatible responses was observed when viewing actions with 
positive outcomes (wins), it was reversed for actions with negative outcomes (losses). 
These data therefore confirm, first, that automatic imitation does not only reflect 
kinematic (“motor”) properties of the observed actions, but also the outcomes they 
produce, suggesting a hierarchical integration of action and outcome. Second, they 
show that the valence of these action outcomes – whether they are positive or negative – 
determines whether automatic imitation is elicited (for positive outcomes), or whether it 
is inhibited (for negative outcomes). The results therefore fully match the results in 
goal-directed imitation studies in children, in which imitation similarly occurs for 
actions with positive outcomes while those with negative outcomes are corrected 
towards a more efficient alternative (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2016; Carpenter et al., 1998; 
Meltzoff, 1995; Over & Gattis, 2010). 
In addition, Experiment 4 helps to rule out two important alternative explanations for 
the observed effect. It revealed, first, that the outcome-dependency of automatic 
imitation was independent of viewing perspective: it was observed both when the 
actions were seen from a 1st person or 3rd person perspective. This confirms that the 
effects indeed reflect automatic imitation and are not restricted to actions attributed to 
one’s own body (for such an effect, see Bach, Fenton-Adams & Tipper, 2014). Second, 
Experiment 4 revealed that the outcome modulation only happens when participants 
judge the outcome of the actions for the actor. If they made the same judgements and 
saw exactly the same stimuli, but now treated the moving hand as belonging to another 
player, all such effects were eliminated.  
Note that this difference between the player and opponent condition are unlikely to just 
reflect changes in attention, for example, if participants would focus on the left or right 
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action in the “player” condition and on the central card in the “opponent” condition. In 
both conditions, the central, non-lateralised card was available from the outset. 
Participants make their judgment directly after-action observation and judged whether 
the card revealed by the observed action caused a win or a loss. Indeed, response times 
in the opponent conditions are, if anything, faster than in the player condition, 
inconsistent with an attention-switch back to the original, centre card once the player 





Chapter 2 established, over four experiments, that automatic imitation in adults may be 
as outcome-driven as goal-directed imitation in children (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2016; 
Carpenter et al., 1998; Meltzoff, 1995). Participants watched actions that either had a 
positive or negative outcome, by revealing a winning or losing card in a game. They 
responded with an action that either matched the just seen action or mismatched it. All 
experiments replicated the well-known automatic imitation effect (e.g. Heyes, 2011; 
Brass et al., 2001; Bach et al., 2008), such that participants performed matching actions 
more quickly than mismatching ones. However, they also revealed, for the first time, 
that this automatic imitation effect depends on the observed action’s outcome. Even 
though the resulting outcomes were not part a proximal part of the observed action, and 
neither causally nor statistically related to them, the response time benefit of matching 
actions was only seen for actions that had a positive outcome and revealed a winning 
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card. For actions with negative outcomes – those revealing losing cards – the automatic 
imitation effect was eliminated and, numerically, reversed.  
This outcome-dependency was observed both when wins and losses were decided based 
on the cards’ symbolic meaning in the game of rock-paper-scissors, (Experiment 3) or 
their numerical value (Experiment 1 & 2), and both when participants saw the actions 
from either a 1st or 3rd person perspective (Experiment 4). What was required was, 
however, that the participants’ judgements referred to the currently observed action. The 
outcome-dependency of automatic imitation was only observed for judgments of the 
current player’s actions. When participants made the same judgments from the 
perspective of the not-acting opponent, all effects were eliminated, even though the 
stimuli and judgments were otherwise identical (Experiment 4). 
Together, these findings reveal that automatic imitation is best conceptualised as a 
hierarchical process that is guided by the valence of the outcome, such that only those 
actions are imitated that have positive outcomes. The outcome-dependency of automatic 
imitation challenges the idea of a simple bottom-up matching of observed kinematic 
information to the observer’s motor repertoire, mediated perhaps by a specifically 
evolved mirror system (e.g., Iacoboni et al., 2001; Iacoboni, 2009) or due to 
sensorimotor learning of correlated motor and perceptual action features (e.g., Heyes, 
2001, 2011). In such a view, both negative and positive action outcomes should elicit 
automatic imitation equally, especially as both types of outcome were not part of the 
observed action, but one of their randomly following distal consequences. Instead, our 
data link automatic imitation to the top-down control in goal-directed imitation in 
children and primates (Call & Carpenter, 2002; Gattis et al., 2002; Elsner, 2007). 
Children similarly do not imitate all actions, but specifically those that produce 
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successful outcomes (for a review, see Elsner, 2007), and even correct unsuccessful or 
erroneous action to their more effective counterpart (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2016; 
Carpenter et al., 1998; Meltzoff, 1995; Over & Gattis, 2010), similar to what was 
observed here for losing cards (Experiment 2).  
While previous studies have shown that automatic imitation is guided by higher-level 
information such as the actor’s goals (Liepelt, von Cramon & Brass, 2008), their typical 
behaviour (Bach et al., 2006; Tipper & Bach, 2011) or the action’s match to the objects 
in the environment (Bach et al., 2010), such an outcome dependency has not been 
reported. Our data therefore supports hierarchical models of action cognition (Hommel 
et al., 2001; Adams et al., 2013; Grafton et al., 2007), which argue that action control is 
based on integrated, hierarchical representations that links the body movements that are 
carried out to the outcomes they produce. While it has been previously suggested that 
such integrated action representations are generated when children watch others’ actions 
and in order to imitate them later (e.g., Elsner, 2007), these experiments are the first to 
suggest that similar integrated representations may also underlie automatic imitation in 
adults. The finding that only outcome evaluations of the observed actor – not the 
opponent – affected automatic imitation particularly supports this interpretation. It ties 
modulation of automatic imitation directly to the evaluation of this particular action – 
and the resulting integrated action representation, but not evaluative processes in 
general.  
One problem with the experiments in the present chapter may be that there is no 
separation of motoric and spatial compatibility. The cards were always presented on the 
left or the right of the centre of the screen, such that motorically matching responses 
were always also spatially matching. Ruling out that the automatic imitation effects 
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reflect spatial compatibility effects, such as the well-established Simon (1969) effect, 
requires a new paradigm that allows for a separation of spatial and motoric codes. Such 





Automatic imitation reflects the facilitation of responses that topographically match a 
task-irrelevant observed action (for a review see Heyes, 2011). For example, in one of 
the original demonstrations participants opened and closed their hands to respond to a 
colour cue (task) which was overlaid on images of hands opening and closing (task-
irrelevant stimulus). Responses were initiated faster when this task irrelevant stimulus 
(e.g. an opening hand) matched the response (opening a hand) and slower when these 
dimensions were mismatching (closing a hand) (Stürmer et al., 2000). This facilitation 
of matching responses and has been replicated for a range of actions with different 
effectors, such as mouth actions (Leighton & Heyes, 2010), finger actions (Catmur et 
al., 2011; Brass et al., 2001; Brass et al.,  2000), arm actions (Gowen et al., 2008; Kilner 
et al.,  2007; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003), hand actions (Craighero et al., 
2002; Craighero et al., 1996; Craighero et al., 1997) and foot actions (Gillmeister et al., 
2008; Bach et al., 2007). This facilitation of matching responses is generally thought of 
as primarily bottom-up driven, guided by a specialised mirror neuron system that 
automatically maps others’ actions onto one’s own body, bypassing any need for 
intentional control (Iacoboni et al., 1999) or higher order cognition (Aczel, Kekecs, 
Bago, Szollosi, & Foldes, 2015). Indeed, several studies have now shown that directing 
attention away from observed actions does not eliminate automatic imitation (e.g., Brass 
et al., 2001; but see Bach et al., 2007). Moreover, automatic imitation is elicited even 
when cognitive resources are occupied (Catmur, 2015), and when imitation conflicts 
with the participants’ own goals (Cook, Bird, Lünser, Huck, & Heyes, 2011). Together, 
these findings provide evidence that the mere observation of an action facilitates 
motoric reproduction of the same action in an automatic fashion (for review and meta-
analysis, see Cracco, Bardi, Desmet, Genschow & Rigoni et al, 2018). 
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Despite the evidence that action stimuli induce automatic imitation, several objections 
against the above interpretation of an automatic matching of observed actions to own 
responses have been put forth. One important objection is that automatic imitation could 
represent a special kind of stimulus response compatibility (e.g., Boyer, Longo, & 
Bertenthal, 2012). In this view, automatic imitation would only be another version of 
the well-known spatial compatibility effects, which describe the phenomenon that 
responses are faster if they occur on the same side as a stimulus (Simon, 1969).  
To distinguish spatial from motoric compatibility, Brass et al. (2000) compared 
symbolic cues to spatial cues in an imitative compatibility experiment. They first 
presented moving hand stimuli in which either the middle or the index finger was raised 
with the numbers 1 and 2 presented centrally as the response cue. Participants were 
required to raise the appropriate finger according to the number that was presented. 
They found that the moving hand stimuli facilitated matching versus mis-matching 
responses, as expected. They then tested whether an imperative spatial cue would 
produce the same effect, by asking participants to respond to an ‘x’ symbol presented on 
the relevant fingernail on the moving or non-moving fingers. Again, participant’s 
responses were facilitated by matching compared to mis-matching trials. To test 
whether the task was truly accessing automatic imitation, Brass et al (2000) then asked 
participants to respond in a non-imitative fashion, where they observed the finger raises 
as described in the previous two experiments, but the response required from them was 
a tapping motion, such that their actions did not kinematically match the actions they 
observed. This third experiment revealed a decrease in the facilitation effect of the 
observed movement and the authors concluded that the motoric similarity between 
observation and execution was the cause of this effect, not the overlap of its spatial 
features. Nevertheless, matching imitative trials were also matching spatially due to the 
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nature of human stimuli (matching stimuli and response finger matched anatomically as 
well as being presented on the left or right), so that it was still possible that some parts 
of the effects were spatially (rather than motorically) mediated. 
Other SRC paradigms have tried to tease kinematic and spatial components apart by 
independently varying whether stimuli and responses matched or mismatched spatially 
or motorically  (i.e. spatially matching and motorically  matching; spatially matching 
and motorically  mismatching; spatially mis-matching and motorically  matching; 
spatially mis-matching and motorically mismatching) (e.g. Catmur et al.,  2011; Chong 
et al.,  2009; Bertenthal et al.,   2006; Heyes et al.,  2005; Brass et al., 2001), or by 
controlling the spatial component in the stimuli. For example, the procedure used by 
Stürmer and colleagues (2000), as reported above, revealed the same imitation 
facilitation if the task-irrelevant action hand stimuli were presented orthogonally to 
response movements (up/down vs left/right movements), thereby eliminating spatial 
correspondences while keeping imitative relationships intact (Heyes et al., 2005). These 
experiments revealed that automatic imitation depends upon the topographical or 
configural aspects of the observed action stimuli rather than their spatial configuration 
in relation to its external position. Nevertheless, in almost all these studies controlling 
for spatial compatibility reduced the overall compatibility effect, but did not eliminate 
it, suggesting that spatial compatibility form part of the effects.  
These considerations raise the possibility that the outcome-dependency we 
demonstrated for automatic imitation in Chapter 2 could also reflect such spatial 
compatibility instead of motoric compatibility effects. In the experiments of Chapter 2, 
the target cards that participants responded to with left and right finger key presses were 
always presented to the left or the right of the central card, and were reached to with 
hands on the left or right of the screen. Whilst the automatic imitation effect was 
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modulated by the outcome of the action, as predicted, it is therefore unclear whether it 
affects the motoric or spatial compatibility of observed actions and responses. Chapter 3 
therefore developed another experimental paradigm in which participants again 
evaluated the valence of the outcomes of observed actions, but in which it could be 
varied independently whether the resulting responses matched the actions spatially 
and/or motorically. This made it possible to disentangle whether the outcome 
modulation observed in Chapter 2 reflects the spatial or motor similarity of observed 




Experiment 1b teased apart whether observed action outcomes affect the spatial or 
motoric components of automatic imitation. Participants observed a model hand from 
an allocentric perspective that was initially in a neutral position near an object and 
would then either grasp the object or withdraw from it. It was varied, between 
participants, whether the object was positioned on the left or the right of the screen such 
that reaches would move from the middle of the screen to the left or to the right, and 
vice versa for withdrawals (see Figure 2b). Half of the objects were safe to grasp 
(orange, wine glass) whilst the other half would cause pain if grasped (cactus, broken 
wine glass). Participants were asked to decide if the action was appropriate to the object 
and would produce a positive outcome (grasping a neutral object, avoiding a painful 
one) or inappropriate and produce a negative outcome (grasping a painful object, 
withdrawing from a neutral one).  
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Crucially, as in prior work (Longo & Bertenthal, 2009), this design independently 
manipulated whether the responses that participants had to make were motorically or 
spatially matching with the observed action, or both. Participants indicated their 
outcome judgments by themselves moving a joystick forwards and backwards in the 
same horizontal plane as the observed action, with the assignment of positive and 
negative judgments to these movements counterbalanced between participants (See 
Figure 1b). This forward or backwards movement therefore mapped onto the reach and 
withdrawals they observed (motoric congruency). Importantly, the joystick was 
positioned parallel to the screen so that these forward and backward movements also 
corresponded with movements to the left or right, such that the spatial locations 
matched or mismatched the observed movements to the left or right (spatial 
congruency). This created an experimental setup in which the outcome of an action was 
either positive or negative, and participants indicated this judgment with responses that 
could either spatially and or motorically match or mismatch the observed actions. It 
therefore made it possible to disentangle whether automatic imitation is outcome 
guided, and whether this outcome guidance specifically impacts the motoric, rather than 
spatial, compatibility of observed and executed actions. 
 
Method 
Participants. 70 participants took part in the experiment (age range from 18 to 45, mean 
age = 23, 17 males, 10 left-handed). They were recruited by the Plymouth University, 
School of Psychology participation system, which includes (non-academic) staff, 
students and members of the public. Participants were given a cash reward of £4 or 
course credit for participation. They were given an information sheet, which explained 
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the experiment and procedure, as well as their right to withdraw at any time, and gave 
informed written consent. No personally identifying information was collected. 
Following the experiment, participants were fully debriefed in writing, and allowed the 
opportunity to ask questions as well as being given contact details for any further 
queries they may have. The experiment was approved in accordance with the ethical 
guidance of Plymouth University and the Declaration of Helsinki. Eight participants 
were excluded from the analysis for making more than 20% of errors, leaving 62 data 
sets for analysis. This provides 80% power to detect effects of d >.36. The effect size of 
the relevant effect in the experiments in Chapter 2 (d = .45) confirms effect sizes are 
likely larger. 
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiment was conducted in a laboratory room with 
participants seated in separate sound proofed cubicles, so that they could complete the 
task without being disturbed. Participants filled out a paper questionnaire which 
contained the images of common household objects that they would later see in the 
experiment. They rated the extent to which they felt that the objects were either painful 
to touch or not on a 5-point Likert scale (Appendix A). These images included: an intact 
glass, a broken glass, a cactus and an orange. Participants were also asked to what 
extent the rating they gave was based on personal experience, again, on a 5-point Likert 
scale.  
The experimental stimuli were presented on a 21-inch monitor with a resolution of 1024 
x 768 pixels, which was arranged at approximately shoulder height of the participants, 
60 cm away. Stimulus presentation was controlled by E prime 2.0. Participants 
responded to the stimuli using a joystick by either pushing it forwards or pulling it 




Figure 1b: Layout combinations of the experiment in each cubicle: A&B show 
participants using their right hand whilst C&D shows participants using their left hand; 
A&C show participants pushing the joystick towards the left for appropriate responses 
and towards the right for inappropriate responses whilst B&D show participants pushing 
the joystick towards the right for appropriate responses and pulling towards the left for 
inappropriate responses; A&D show participants pulling backwards for inappropriate 
actions and pushing the joystick forwards for appropriate actions whilst B&C show 
participants pulling backwards for appropriate actions and pushing the joystick forwards 
for inappropriate actions. 
 
 
Participants evaluated the outcomes of observed actions with joystick movements. The 
joystick was attached to the table, so that it could not be moved and was positioned so 
that it would only move in the horizontal plane, parallel to the monitor. Forwards and 
backwards motions would therefore require a left or right movement across the body 
rather than towards or away from the computer screen. Printed arrow labels were always 
placed at either side of the joystick with the words ‘Appropriate’ and ‘Inappropriate’ in 
clear view of the participant to prevent confusion (counterbalanced between 
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participants).  Participants were requested to keep their arm parallel to the screen during 
the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to use a specific hand to respond. 
Counterbalancing of hand used and joystick movement required for positive/negative 
outcome evaluations resulted in four different response assignments that were varied 
between participants (A—right handed with a forwards response for “appropriate” 
actions, B—right handed with a backwards response for “appropriate” actions, C—left 
handed with a forwards response for “Inappropriate” actions, D—left handed with a 
backwards response for “Inappropriate” actions).  
The stimulus consisted of sixteen two-frame action sequences. Each sequence started 
with an initial, neutral image that showed either a right or left hand ready to reach in the 
middle of the screen and a potential target object on the left or right. It then switched to 
the target image, without any SOA, which showed the hand either grasping the object, 
or withdrawing from it (see figure 2b). There were four objects, two of which (broken 
wine glass or cactus) were painful to grasp and two which (intact wine glass and 







Figure 2b: Examples of experimental stimuli for each combination of space, movement 
and appropriateness showing frame 1 above and the target frame below. 
 
 
Design & Procedure. All participants had the task to report, by pressing the joystick 
forwards or backwards, whether an observed action was appropriate or inappropriate. 
Participants first completed ten practice trials selected at random from the experimental 
stimuli list, and then two experimental blocks. Each experimental block consisted of 
random without replacement selection of each of the sixteen stimuli. This repeated 
thirteen times within each block, resulting in 208 experimental trials per block (416 in 
total).  
Each trial began with a blank screen presented for 800 ms. A fixation cross appeared for 
300 ms which was then followed by another blank screen for 300 ms. The first (neutral) 
frame, depicting a hand in neutral position near an object, was presented for 500 ms 
followed by the target stimulus, showing the hand either reach or withdrawing from the 
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objects (see figure 2b for example). As neutral and target action image followed each 
other without any gap, this created the impression of apparent motion (Wertheimer, 
1912). If the action shown in the target frame was appropriate, i.e. the hand withdrew 
from a painful object or grasped an object that would cause no pain, participants pushed 
the joystick in the designated direction (see figure 3b). If the action shown was 
inappropriate i.e. the hand grasped a painful object or withdrew from an object that 
would cause no pain, participants produced the opposite action with the joystick. to 
which participants were given infinite time to make a response. The next trial started 
after participants made their response.  
 
Results 
The response time data (Figure 3b) was analysed using a three factor, repeated measures 
ANOVA with the factor Appropriateness (appropriate: withdrawing from a painful 
object or grasping a safe object; inappropriate: grasping a painful object or withdrawing 
from a safe object), Motor Compatibility (motorically matching: pushing a joystick 
forward when seeing a reach or backwards when seeing a withdrawal; motorically 
mismatching: pushing a joystick forward when seeing a withdrawal or backwards when 
seeing a reach forward) and Spatial Compatibility (spatially matching: pushing the 
joystick to the right when seeing an action towards the right or to the left when seeing 
an action to the left; spatially mismatching: pushing the joystick to the right when 
seeing an action towards the left or to pushing it to the left when seeing an action to the 
right).  
The results of the ANOVA revealed no main effect of Spatial Compatibility, F(1, 58) 
= .281, p=.598, and no interaction of Spatial Compatibility with Appropriateness, F(1, 
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58) = .445, p=.507. However, as predicted from the idea that automatic imitation 
captures the kinematic features of the observed action, the ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of Motor Compatibility F(1, 58) = 18.132, p< .001, η2 = .24. Participants were 
faster to produce a motorically matching response (M=950 ms) than a motorically 
mismatching response (M=1012 ms). Moreover, as in Chapter 2, this effect was further 
qualified by an interaction of Motor Compatibility and Appropriateness, F(1,58)= 5.53, 
p=.02, η2 =.08. As can be seen in Figure 3b, the speed up of matching actions was only 
present for actions with positive outcomes (i.e. reaches to safe objects and withdrawals 
from painful objects) but not those with negative outcomes, fully replicating the 
















Figure 3b: Reaction times in Experiment 1b: The top panel shows spatial compatibility 
effects and the bottom panel shows motoric compatibility effects. In each panel, the left 
two bars show responses made after observing an inappropriate action that was 
appropriate and the right bars show responses after observing an inappropriate action. 
The black and white bars show responses that either matched or mismatched the spatial 
(left panel) or motor (right panel) features of the stimuli. Error bars show the standard 
error of the mean.  
 
None of the other, unpredicted effects reached significance, especially when it is 
considered that unpredicted effects in an ANOVA are subject to alpha inflation and 
therefore must interpreted against a more stringent (Bonferroni-corrected) threshold 
(e.g. Cramer, 2016). In particular, there was no effect of Appropriateness, F(1, 58) = 
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3.367, p = .07, no interaction of Spatial Compatibility and Motor Compatibility, F(1, 
58) = 3.478, p = .067, and no three-way interaction, F(1, 58) = .026, p = .872.  
Analysis of the error rates with the same ANOVA revealed a similar pattern as the 
analysis of the response times. A main effect was found for Motor Compatibility, F(1, 
58) = 15.479, p<.000, η2= .211, which again interacted with Appropriateness, F(1, 58) 
= 10.292, p=.002, η2= .151, Participants made fewer errors during motorically 
matching responses than motorically mismatching responses, and this difference was 
larger for actions with positive outcomes (See Figure 3b). While the error analysis also 
revealed a main effect of Spatial Compatibility, F(1, 58) = 4.11, p=.047, η2 = .066, 
which interacted with Appropriateness F(1, 58) = 4.67, p=.035, η2 = .075, it should be 
interpreted with caution before being replicated, as it only just passed the alpha of .05 
and was in the opposite direction than predicted. Participants made fewer error for 
responses that were spatially mismatching with the observed action, again specifically 
for actions with positive outcomes. There were no further main effects or interactions 
(Appropriateness, F(1, 58) = .067, p=.79; Spatial Compatibility by Motor 
Compatibility, F(1, 58) = .093, p=.88; Appropriateness, Spatial compatibility by Motor 






Figure 4b: Proportion of errors Experiment 1b: The top panel shows spatial 
compatibility effects and the bottom panel shows motoric compatibility effects. In each 
panel, the left two bars show responses made after observing an inappropriate action 
that was appropriate and the right bars show responses after observing an inappropriate 
action. The black and white bars show responses that either matched or mismatched the 
spatial (left panel) or motor (right panel) features of the stimuli. Error bars show the 









Experiment 1b shows, like the studies in Chapter 2, that observed action outcomes 
modulate automatic imitation. These data reveal that higher-level representations of the 
value of an action’s outcomes affect automatic imitation, such that only those actions with 
positive outcomes produce a tendency to respond similarly. Importantly, the current study 
independently manipulated the spatial and motoric compatibility of observed actions and 
responses. The results showed that the above interaction reflected specifically the 
kinematic – but not the spatial – features of the observed action. Thus, after viewing an 
action with a positive outcome, participants found it easier to move their own hand 
forwards or backwards when they had just seen the hand on the screen perform a similar 
forward/backward movement. In contrast, the analysis revealed to such effect for the 
spatial matching of observed actions and responses. If anything, observing an appropriate 
action induced a negative spatial compatibility effect such that participants found it easier 
to move their hand in the opposite to the action they observed.  
These data show, first, as suggested by others (Longo et al., 2009; Wohlschläger et al., 
2003; Liepelt et al., 2010), that automatic imitation cannot just be explained in terms of the 
spatial features of the observed actions but draws upon motoric or kinematic features. 
Second, it shows that the outcome dependency observed in Chapter 2 is a replicable 
phenomenon that extends to the type of reaching actions seen here. Third, and most 
importantly, it shows that the outcome modulation observed in Chapter 2 specifically 
affects the similarity of one’s own responses with the motoric components of the observed 
action, not its spatial features.   
An open question is on what level the action’s kinematic features are encoded. It is 
possible that the facilitation for matching (versus mis-matching) appropriate actions may 
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not reflect the encoding of the action’s motoric features (Kornblum, Hasbroucq & Osman, 
1990), such as an arm moving forwards or backwards, but more abstract spatial codes that 
reflect the hands’ movement towards or away from the goal object, that is, more general 
representations of the action as approach and avoid. Indeed, several studies suggest that 
automatic imitation sometimes occurs in such an object-centred reference frame (Aicken, 
Wilson, Williams, & Mon-Williams, 2007). Viewing lifting or tapping fingers produces 
the same compatibility effects than when viewing the same actions using a pen, and 
participants responded similarly when viewing an opening or closing hand or dots moving 
away or toward each other (Jansson, Wilson, Williams & Mon-Williams, 2007). The 
implication is that automatic imitation is not unique to the observation of biological 
motion but could reflect the encoding of such abstract changes in a spatial reference frame.  
To tease apart how the kinematic features of the actions are encoded in the current 
experiment, a second experiment was devised which replaced the human stimuli with an 





In Experiment 2b, participants were tested using the same paradigm as in Experiment 1b 
but the hand was replaced with an image of a bubble, which approached or withdrew from 
the same household objects.  Participants’ were told that the bubble moved through an 
obstacle course, and that half of the objects were safe for the bubble to touch (orange, wine 
glass) whilst half would cause it to burst (cactus, broken wine glass). Participants were 
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again asked to decide if the bubble moved appropriately (bubble touches a neutral object, 
avoids a dangerous one) or an inappropriately (the bubble touches a dangerous object or 
avoids neutral one) for its safety relative to the given object. To make these judgments, 
participants moved their hands in the same or different spatial direction to that produced 
by the bubble by moving a joystick left and right, and these movements either matched the 
bubble’s forwards or backwards movement in the given reference frame.   
If participants encoded the actions kinematically in Experiment 1b, motoric compatibility 
effects should now be reduced, and not modulated by outcome. Instead, results may now 
reveal a 3rd-person spatial encoding of the observed movements. In contrast, if people 
encoded the movements as more abstract approaches or avoidance of obstacle, then the 
same effects as in Experiment 1b should be observed. 
 
Method 
Participants. 69 participants were tested for the experiment, (age range from 18 to 45, 
mean age = 23, 5 males, 7 left-handed). They were recruited in the same way as in 
Experiment 1b. Five participants were not considered for analysis because they made 
more than 30% of errors. The final sample size of 64 provides 80% power to detect 
effect sizes larger than d = .31. Previous experiments suggested that effect sizes are 
likely larger. 
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure. Participants completed the same paper questionnaire 
as in Experiment 1b. They rated the extent to which they felt that the objects used in the 
experiment were either painful to touch or not on a 5-point Likert scale (Appendix A).  
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Apparatus and stimuli were identical to Experiment 1, but the images of the reaching 
hands were replaced with bubbles (Figure 5b). Thus, eight sets of two images were 
produced for each bubble (right and left to the goal object in the neutral frame). The 
initial image was of a bubble in neutral position near one of four objects of Experiment 
1b. The target image was of the bubble either touching the object, or moving away from 
it, in the same position as the hand was in in Experiment 1b. Combining both images 
without temporal gap created the impression of the bubble’s apparent motion 
(Wertheimer, 1912) towards or away from objects. 
During the instructions phase of the experiment, participants were told that they were 
inspecting special fans in a ‘bubble making factory’. The bubbles needed to travel from 
one end of the factory to the other in the safest way, and in the quickest time possible. 
The participants were advised that two of the objects (broken wine glass or cactus) were 
dangerous to the bubble, making it burst. The other two objects (intact wine glass and 
orange) were safe for the bubble to touch and it would just bounce off. If the action 
shown in the scene was appropriate and produced a positive outcome, i.e. the bubble 
withdrew from or avoided a dangerous object or touched an object that would not cause 
it to burst, participants pushed the joystick in the designated direction (again forward or 
backward in the horizontal plane before the monitor). If the action shown was 
inappropriate i.e. the bubble touched a dangerous object or withdrew from or avoided an 
object that would not cause it to burst, participants responded with the opposite 
movement of the joystick. Importantly, the bubble in the stimuli was positioned so that 
it was in exactly the same place as the contact point of the hand in Experiment 1b (see 
figure 5b for examples). This meant that the movement and distance travelled would 
match exactly for both experiments. The timings for presentation of stimuli exactly 





Figure 5b: Examples of experimental stimuli for each combination of space, movement 






As in Experiment 1b, the Response times (Figure 6b) was analysed using a three factor, 
repeated measures ANOVA with the factor Appropriateness (appropriate: moving away 
from a painful object or grasping a safe object; inappropriate: moving towards a painful 
object or withdrawing from a safe object), Motor Compatibility (motorically matching: 
pushing a joystick forward when seeing a movement towards an object or backwards 
when seeing a movement away from an object; motorically mismatching: pushing a 
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joystick forward when seeing a movement away from an object or backwards when 
seeing a movement towards an object) and Spatial Compatibility (spatially matching: 
pushing the joystick to the right when seeing a movement towards the right or to the left 
when seeing an movement to the left; spatially mismatching: pushing the joystick to the 
right when seeing a movements towards the left or to pushing it to the left when seeing 








Figure 6b: Reaction times in Experiment 2b: The top panel shows spatial compatibility 
effects and the bottom panel shows motoric compatibility. In each panel, the left two 
bars show responses made after observing an action that was appropriate. The right two 
bars show responses made after observing an action that was inappropriate. The black 
and white bars show responses that either matched or mismatched the spatial (left panel) 





The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Appropriateness F(1, 60) = 101.465, p < .001, 
η2= .628, with participants making appropriate judgements more slowly than 
inappropriate judgments. It revealed no main effect of Spatial compatibility F(1, 60) = 
2.247, p=.139 or Motor Compatibility F(1, 60) = .107, p=.745. Appropriateness did 
neither interact with Spatial Compatibility F(1, 60) = 2.627, p=.11, η2= .042, not with 
Motor Compatibility F(1, 60) = .544, p=.464.  
The analysis of the error rates (Figure 7b) revealed no main effects of Spatial 
Compatibility F(1, 60) = .325, p=.571, Motor Compatibility F(1, 60) = 2.364, p=.129 
or Appropriateness, F(1, 60) = 074, p=.786. Appropriateness did not interact with 
spatial compatibility F(1, 60) = 1.008, p=.32. As in Experiment 1b, however, there was 
an interaction between Appropriateness and Motor Compatibility F(1, 60) = 7.984, 
p=.006, η2= .117. When viewing a bubble movement with positive outcome, 
participants made more errors when making a movement that motorically mismatched 
this movement than when it matched. This difference was, if anything, reversed when 
viewing bubble movements with negative outcomes. Spatial Compatibility did not 
interact with Motor Compatibility F(1, 60) = .822, p=.368. No three-way interaction 








Figure 7b: Proportion of errors: Proportion of errors Experiment 2b: The left panel 
shows spatial compatibility effects and the right panel shows motoric compatibility 
effects. In each panel, the left two bars show responses made after observing an action 
that was appropriate. The right two bars show responses made after observing an action 
that was inappropriate. The black bars show responses that matched either the spatial 
(left panel) or motor aspects of the stimuli (right panel). The white bars show responses 






A crucial question is whether the spatial or motoric compatibility effects differ between 
experiments. We therefore compared the main effects of Spatial and Motor 
Compatibility, as well as their interactions with Appropriateness, with a combined 
ANOVA that also included the between-experiments factor Experiment.  
For brevity, only the interactions of theoretical interest are reported. Analysis of 
response times revealed no interaction of Spatial Compatibility and Experiment, F(1, 
118) = .435, p=.511, and neither a three-way interaction of Appropriateness, Spatial 
Compatibility and Experiment F(1, 118) = 2.412, p=.123. However, it revealed the 
predicted interaction of Motor Compatibility and Experiment, F(1, 118) = 11.102, 
p=.001, η2= .086, showing that, overall, motoric compatibility effects were larger when 
participants judged the movements of (animate) hands compared to (inanimate) bubbles. 
There was no three-way interaction of Appropriateness, Motoric Compatibility, and 
Experiment F(1, 118) = .539, p=.464. 
The analysis of error rates revealed the predicted interactions between Spatial 
compatibility and Experiment, F(1, 118) = 2.751, p=.10, η2= .023, and between 
Appropriateness, Spatial Compatibility and Experiment, F(1, 118) = 4.685, p=.033, 
η2= .038. Thus, while viewing hand movements induced negative spatial compatibility 
effects, facilitating movements in the opposite direction, specifically after positive 
outcomes, this effect was abolished when the same movements were performed by 
inanimate bubbles. 
There also was a marginally significant interaction of Motor Compatibility and 
Experiment, F(1, 118) = 2,865, p=.093, η2= .024, which was, however, not qualified by 
a three-way interaction of Appropriateness, Motor Compatibility and Experiment, F(1, 
118) = .306, p=.581. Thus, as in the response time analysis, while the amount of Spatial 
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Compatibility and its modulation by Appropriateness increased in the bubbles 





Experiment 2b tested whether the automatic imitation effects of Experiment 1b – and 
the observed modulation through action outcomes – could also be replicated when 
participants observed the movements of an inanimate object. The results were mixed. 
On the one hand, overall measures of automatic imitation of the action’s kinematic 
features were consistently reduced when participants observed bubble, as opposed to 
hand movements. Viewing bubbles move forward or backwards towards or away from 
an object did not generally speed up similar forward or backward joystick movements. 
This reduced effect is similar to previous investigations showing that automatic 
imitation is generally reduced for computer generated hands as opposed to photographic 
human hand actions (Shea, 2009), and for movements seen to be unintentional 
compared to intentional, even if the stimuli themselves are identical (Longo et al., 
2008). It therefore confirms that automatic imitation, in this paradigm, reflects an 
encoding of the action’s kinematic features, rather than just an abstract representation of 
approach or avoiding objects. 
Strikingly, however, at least in the error rates, the outcome modulation of automatic 
imitation was still observed, even if automatic imitation effects themselves were 
reduced. This suggests that outcome evaluation itself – whether seeing a movement 
produces a positive or negative outcome for the agent –can induce a goal directed mode 
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of processing, and, perhaps, cause the seen movements to be evaluated teleologically: as 
moving towards and away from obstacles. Our data suggest that as soon as this 
teleological encoding of observed movements is present even for inanimate objects, 
then the outcomes these movements produce either induce a stronger tendency to 
imitate (in the case of positive outcomes) or to not imitate the movement (in the case of 




This chapter described two experiments that tested whether automatic imitation is 
outcome dependent (e.g. Wohlschläger et al.,2003), whether it can be separated from 
spatial compatibility (e.g. Simon., 1969) and whether it specifically reflects the 
kinematics of human movements, compared to that of inanimate objects.  
The data confirm, first, that automatic imitation is outcome dependent. Participants 
observed actions which either had positive or negative outcomes (by way of an 
interaction between a hand and a safe or painful object). Participants responded with a 
movement that either motorically or spatially matched or mismatched the observed 
action and to stimuli which showed the actions of a person (Experiment 1) or of a non-
human object (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the actions’ outcome modulated 
automatic imitation, such that actions with positive outcomes (approaching a safe 
object, withdrawing from a dangerous one) produced stronger automatic imitation 
effects than actions with negative outcomes (withdrawing from a safe object, 
approaching a dangerous object). The present experiments therefore replicate the results 
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of Chapter 2 in a new paradigm and with new stimuli. They add to the growing 
consensus that automatic imitation can be thought of as goal directed, similarly to 
children’s goal directed imitation (e.g. Elsner et al., 2003; Nielsen et al., 2011; Southgate 
et al., 2009).   
Second, these experiments allowed effects of kinematic versus spatial compatibility to 
be disentangled. In the previous experiments (Chapter 2), whilst automatic imitation 
was also affected by outcome information, this effect could not be separated from other 
forms of stimulus-response compatibility. The results of the present experiments show 
that the outcome modulation affected specifically the kinematic encoding of the 
observed actions as forward and backwards towards or away from objects (from the 
actor’s perspective), rather than as left and right (from the participants’ perspective). In 
Experiment 1b, if anything, outcome modulated spatial compatibility effects in the 
opposite manner: for actions with positive outcomes, participants responded more 
quickly with spatially mismatching rather than matching responses. Thus, at least in the 
experiments presented here, action outcomes specifically modulated the imitation of the 
action’s kinematic (forward/backwards) components, rather than its spatial (left/right) 
organisation. It is therefore different from Simon-based (Simon, 1969) spatial 
compatibility and tied to representing the action from the actor’s point of view as 
forward/backwards movement. 
Finally, the experiments showed that automatic imitation in general, specifically the 
imitation of the action’s kinematic components, is tied to the observation of human 
(animate) motions. Automatic imitation effects were generally reduced for the 
observation of movements of inanimate bubbles, even though the experiments went to 
great lengths to make sure both the task and stimuli matched as closely as possible. For 
example, the bubbles in Experiment 2b were presented in the same coordinates and 
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travelled the same distances as the hands in Experiment 1, and we gave participants an 
elaborate back story so that they were able to view the movements of the bubble in an as 
meaningful way as the movements of the hand. These results therefore add to previous 
reports that automatic imitation is stronger when observing biological, intentional 
actions (e.g., Kilner et al., 2003) compared to unintentional ones, even if this difference 
is just implied by the instruction while stimuli were identical (Longo et al., 2009). 
However, in contrast to the current experiments, these prior studies were not able to link 
these modulations specifically to the imitation of the action’s kinematic rather than 
spatial components.  
What was striking that while viewing bubbles (as opposed to hands) reduced overall 
automatic imitation, it seemed to leave its modulation by outcome relatively unaffected. 
The analysis of the error rates showed that even if participants judged the outcome of 
bubble movements, they were more prepared to make a similar forward/backward 
movement in, if the seen bubble movement had a positive outcome, compared to a 
negative one. This suggests that evaluating movements as goal directed can, by itself, 
induce a kinematic action coding, and its evaluation by outcome. In other words, these 
data suggest that even when viewing inanimate objects people can “embody” their 
movements, as long as these movements are evaluated in an outcome-based manner.  
These findings link the present automatic imitation task to findings in biological motion 
perception in children. Even very young children can see inanimate object movements 
as goal directed, if these movements show features of intentional movement, such as 
avoidance of obstacles or a speed up towards a goal (e.g. Gao, McCarthy, & Scholl, 
2010)). They also link to findings in adults showing that participants embody (i.e. take 
the perspective) of inanimate objects in Heider and Simmel-like displays (Heider & 
Simmel, 1944), if they consistently behave in a meaningful way and follow intentional 
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movement patterns (Zwickel & Mueller, 2010). We speculate that our (top-down) 
instructions to be “bubble safety officers” and evaluate the bubbles in a positive or 
negative way may have induced a similar “intentional stance” (Dennett, 1989) and 
induced a tendency to copy their positive but not their negative actions.  
In more general terms, the outcome dependency of automatic imitation observed here 
provides a challenge to models which describe it in terms of a bottom-up matching of 
the kinematic information during observation with own action possibilities of the 
observer. Neither theories embracing associative learning of contingencies between 
vision and action (Heyes, 2010) nor direct-matching by way of specialist mirror 
function can account for the top-down influences observed in these experiments 
(Rizzolatti et al., 2008). In these views, both positive and negative action outcomes 
should have facilitated compatible responses equally. Instead, this data could be better 
explained by accounts that integrate top-down control in goal-directed imitation (e.g., 
Elsner, 2007). In such views, automatic imitation can be described similarly to goal-
directed imitation in children and primates which show similar positive outcome-
dependence. For example, children only imitate actions which produce successful 
outcomes and will even correct errors in action observations, producing the intended 
successful outcome rather than that which was observed (Hauf et al., 2004; Carpenter et 
al., 2005; Carpenter et al., 1998). Thus, either actions that are positive inspire the 
observer to imitate the actor, or actions that are negative cause inhibition of the 
observed action in the participant.  
One problem of the current studies may be that we asked participants to actively 
evaluate the outcomes of the observed movements. The data from Experiment 2 in 
particular suggests that such an instruction can, by itself, induce a teleological encoding 
of actions, in terms of moving towards or away from objects, thereby inducing 
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automatic imitation. The experiments in Chapter 4 address this problem and will 
attempt to replicate the outcome guidance of automatic imitation in a task in which 





The experiments in Chapters 2 and 3 tested whether the outcome of an observed action 
affects automatic imitation. Observing an action facilitated imitative responses only 
when the outcome of the action was positive. When the outcome was negative no such 
facilitation was observed. These studies therefore show that imitation cannot merely be 
attributed to a simple bottom-up matching of observed actions to one’s own action 
repertoires. Instead, automatic imitation seems to be dynamically guided by higher-level 
representations of the value or consequence of a given action, which is integrated into 
the representation of the observed action and directly affects whether participants 
imitated or not. Importantly, this happened even though outcome information was not 
part of the action’s kinematic properties nor was is it causally related to the actions that 
were observed.  
These findings provide a challenge for approaches that conceptualize automatic 
imitation as an unintentional matching of the proximal properties of observed actions to 
the observer’s own physical capabilities. Models have been suggested that include 
automatic bottom-up mediation via specific mechanisms such as the mirror neuron 
system (e.g. Iacoboni, 2009) or as a result of sensorimotor learning of compounded 
perceptual and motor components of movement (e.g. Heyes, 2010). In either of these 
cases the positive and negative aspect of the action outcome should not induce a 
difference in automatic imitation. Instead, the data in this thesis favours hierarchical 
models of action and action observation (e.g. Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & 
Prinz., 2001; Hamilton, Joyce, Flanagan, Frith, & Wolpert., 2007; Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Gattis., 2000; Csibra, & Gergely., 2009), in which simple motor acts 
are embedded in a hierarchy of intended outcomes (the goals) and ways in which they 
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can be achieved (the means). In such views, automatic imitation happens not because 
people simply copy each other’s motor behaviour, but because they evaluate the goals 
or outcomes that the observed actor wants to achieve with it (Bouquet, Shipley, Capa, & 
Marshall, 2011; see Campbell & Cunnington, 2017). 
Such a top-down guidance is clearly present in early so-called “goal directed” imitation 
in children and non-human primates (e.g., Call & Carpenter, 2002; Gattis, Bekkering 
&Wohlschläger, 2002; Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993; Hauf, Elsner, and 
Aschersleben, 2004; Corriveau, Min, Chin & Doan, 2016; Huang, Heyes & Charman, 
2002; for a review, see Elsner, 2007). Children’s imitation involves copying others’ 
observed body movements to attain the same (positive) outcomes. They specifically 
imitate actions with salient desirable outcomes, and the specific body movements are 
only copied when children do not already have more effective means at their disposal 
(i.e. “emulation”, Tomasello, 1996; Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Meltzoff, 
1988; Meltzoff, 1995; Over & Gattis, 2010), or for creating/maintaining social bonds 
(e.g. Over & Carpenter, 2012). 
The studies in Chapter 2 and 3 resolve several problems that have plagued previous 
attempts to demonstrate similar top-down guidance in adult automatic imitation. In a 
seminal study, for example, Liepelt and colleagues (2008) reported that people imitate 
the inferred goal of an observed action (e.g., to lift a finger) rather than what is actually 
carried out (finger held in place by a clamp). Similarly, people imitate actions more if 
they appear to be purposeful and are directed towards a valid goal object (e.g., Bach, 
Bayliss & Tipper, 2011). These findings do suggest that people do not simply map 
observed actions onto their motor system, but – like in children’s imitation – that what 
is imitated is the outcome that the model was trying to achieve: the action’s goal. 
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However, such findings can be well explained in bottom-up views if one simply 
assumes that (1) motoric matching does not need to rely on directly observed actions 
but can also emerge from actions that are merely imaged or predicted, and that (2) 
knowing another person’s goal elicits such predictions of most likely actions. Indeed, 
several studies have recently shown that attributing goals to others causes such 
anticipations of their forthcoming actions, which are realised in a perceptual format and 
can therefor drive automatic imitation, as if directly observed (e.g., Hudson et al., 
2016ab; 2017; Joyce, Schenke, Bayliss & Bach., 2014).  In such views, therefore, top-
down guidance only affects imagery and prediction processes, while automatic imitation 
reflects a bottom-up “motoric matching” processes that simply act on the resulting 
perceptual representations. For the experiments in Chapter 2 and 3 such an 
interpretation is unlikely, because the outcome was presented after the action was 
observed, making it less likely to induce imagery-like processes that could guide 
automatic imitation.  
Another problem addressed by the experiments in Chapter 2 is that many tasks that are 
assumed to measure automatic imitation may not do so, or not do so exclusively, also 
capturing the observed action’s spatial properties in the same way as of non-social 
stimuli, such as the body part’s location in space, its direction, or its speed. For 
example, when viewing a left finger being depressed one might not respond faster with 
ones’ own left finger due to a tendency to imitate, but simply because stimuli on the left 
side are generally responded to more quickly with a left-sided response, and vice versa 
for stimuli on the right (i.e. the well-known Simon effect, 1969). Indeed, when Longo & 
Bertenthal (2009) attempted to disentangle spatial and motoric components during 
automatic imitation, they found evidence for two independent influences, with a larger 
contribution of the spatial congruency (but see Gracco et al., 2018 for a recent meta-
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analysis that comes to the opposite conclusion). If this is the case, then many of the 
above-reviewed top-down effects could simply reflect top-down changes to how the 
observed actions were spatially represented, again undermining any strong link to 
automatic imitation. While this problem exists for the experiments in Chapter 2, it is 
fully ruled out in Chapter 3, where automatic imitation reflected a copying of the 
kinematic – not spatial – action features. 
One problem that remains unaddressed in the present experiments is that in many of the 
tasks that found top-down effects in automatic imitation, as in the studies in Chapters 2 
and 3, participants were explicitly instructed to evaluate the outcomes of the observed 
actions, such that the participant’s responses actions (presses/push & pull) often did not 
only differ in terms of whether they imitated an action with a positive or negative 
outcome, but also in their response meaning, for example, whether they signaled a 
positive or negative evaluation or a “yes” vs. “no” response, with large differences in 
response times. Especially if one accepts the fundamental difference in how yes and no 
responses are encoded in the brain (Merten & Nieder, 2012) or that they require 
different (i.e. exhaustive vs. matching) search processes (Van Zandt &Townsend, 
1993), it may perhaps not be that surprising that one is found to be more susceptible to 
imitation than the other.  
The experiments in Chapter 4 were designed to provide the first test of the top-down 
control of automatic imitation in face to face interactions, while staying clear of all three 
caveats described above. As before, it rests on the notion that if automatic imitation is as 
goal-directed as imitation in children, then it should be similarly affected by action 
outcomes, with imitation being stronger – or restricted to – actions with positive 
outcomes, and that this should be the case even if these outcomes did not have to be 
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evaluated by participants. In contrast, if it just reflects a bottom-up matching of 
observed action kinematics to the own motor responses, then the outcomes of an action 
– that happen after the action is completed – should not affect the responses. 
To test this idea, a novel task was developed. In the task, two participants sat opposite 
each other across a touch screen and took turns drawing trajectories from a home area 
directly in front of them towards targets appearing on the left and right. It was inspired 
by previous tasks designed to measure inhibitory processes in imitation. The social 
inhibition of return effect (Skarratt, et al., 2016) describes the well-established finding 
that people generally carry out actions more quickly to the object towards which the 
partner had not just reached to, because it is difficult to re-orient attention towards an 
object one has just attended to when watching the partner’s action (Skarratt, Cole & 
Kingston., 2010). Here, we use this type of paradigm to measure not this attention-
orienting effect, but whether the kinematics of the movements reflect the automatic 
imitation the other partner’s specific movement trajectory, and whether it is affected by 
the partner’s action outcome.  
The experiments in Chapter 4 followed a two-step strategy. In a first experiment, it was 
established that automatic imitation can generally be observed in this task and that it 
captures motoric/kinematic matching. To this end, participants interacted with a 
confederate, who sometimes would make either straight reaches towards the target, 
curved reaches that were signalled by an obstacle in their way that they had to 
circumvent, or curved reaches that were made in the absence of any visual cue. This 
allowed us to test whether participants would automatically copy this curvature, even if 
there was no obstacle for them to avoid. By comparing whether they copy these 
curvatures both for motivated (through an obstacle) curved reaches and unmotivated 
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ones, allows us to confirm that imitation indeed proceeds on the basis of a kinematic 
matching rather than based on seeing a reach around an obstacle.  
Once automatic imitation of action kinematics is established, we then ran a second 
study in which two participants interacted in the same task, to test whether kinematic 
imitation depends on the outcomes of the observed action. We therefore randomly 
varied, after each successful reach of the target of each player, the outcome of the 
action, playing either a sound that signalled a positive outcome (that the experiment 
would terminate one trial earlier) or a negative outcome (that the experiment would not 
terminate earlier). We again measured if curved reaches would be imitated by the next 
actor and be reflected in their trajectory even if no obstacle was present. Crucially, such 
an effect should only be present for actions with positive outcomes, and not negative 
ones. It would establish the outcome guidance of automatic imitation, like it is seen in 
goal-directed imitation in children, while staying clear of the caveats and confounds 
outlines above. Specifically, such a finding would allow us to (a) link effects to the 
kinematic imitation of trajectories rather than an action’s spatial components, (b) in a 
task of real face to face interaction, in which (c) participants did not have to actively 
evaluate outcomes and their responses did not differ between both outcomes, and (d) 
without a possibility to account for the effects in terms of imagery or prediction of the 








Experiment 1c provided a first test as to whether automatic imitation of action 
kinematics can be measured in our alternating reaching task. Participants interacted with 
the experimenter who sat on the opposite side of a touch screen. Participants and 
experimenter would take turns reaching, on this touch screen, from a home area directly 
in front of them towards targets that appear to the left and right. To measure imitation of 
action kinematics, both participant and experimenter would, in some trials, reach 
straight to the target. In other trials, however, an obstacle would appear together with 
the target as soon as they put their fingers into the start position, and participant and 
experimenter were instructed to reach around it (see Figure 1c). If people imitate 
observed action kinematics, participants should make a higher reach after just having 
observed the experimenter make a higher reach around an obstacle. To ensure that any 
such effect indeed reflects kinematics (rather than imitation of a higher-level goal of 
object avoidance), we asked the experimenter to make, from time to time, curved 
reaches towards the target even if no obstacle was present. To ensure random 
distribution of these trials, such curved reaches were cued to the experimenter through 
“beep” sounds played through the headphones they were wearing, unbeknownst to the 
participant. If participants automatically copy the kinematic of the observed reach, then 
their own reach should be more curved whenever they have just seen a curved reach, 








Thirty six participants (age range from 18 to 35, mean age = 20.6, 6 males, 6 left 
handed), all members of the public and recruited through the Plymouth University, 
School of Psychology participation system, took part in the experiment, in exchange for 
curse credits or a cash reward of £4. Participants were excluded when making more than 
20% errors in total (zero participants excluded). One participant was excluded for not 
performing the task correctly as indicated by an average Y-coordinate outside the range 
of goal and start locations. Participants were fully briefed and debriefed and gave 
informed consent, in accordance with the ethical guidance of Plymouth University and 
the Declaration of Helsinki.  
Generally, a sample size of 35 provides .80 power to detect interaction effects with 
Cohen’s d = .487. A prior pilot experiment established the predicted effect and 
suggested that effect sizes are likely higher (Cohen’s d = .76).  
 
Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was conducted in a laboratory room with participants sitting opposite 
each other at a table, with a touch screen laid flatly on top of it. The touch screen was a 
16:9, with a resolution of 1920 x 1080. Stimuli on the touch screen consisted of a grey 
rectangle in front of each player, designated as the start position (size 200 pixels by 200 
pixels) located centrally on the screen nearer the participant 400 pixels from the centre. 
Blue squares (size 200 pixels by 200 pixels) served as the target areas, and could appear 
to the left or right of the participant (600 pixels from the centre of the screen), directly 
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on the midline between participant and opponent. The obstacles that could appear were 
red upright rectangles (100 pixels by 500 pixels) that were placed between the starting 
area and the target area, with their lower boundary located at the current players screen 
end. See Figure 1c for a schematic. 
 
 
Figure 1c: Left image shows a visual representation of experimental set up. Right 
image represents a potential movement made during a trial. Star represents point at 
which movement would pass an obstacle or not. 
 
 
Y coordinates of the participants’ reaches were continuously sampled during each 
trajectory, and then, for data reduction purposes, binned in 6 bins of 100 pixels width 
along the X axis, reaching from the first bin at the start position, to the 6th bin at the 
target area position in the left or right. The obstacle location corresponded to bin 2 and 
3. As reaches to the left and right were symmetrical, the data from reaches to the left 
were “flipped” along the Y axis and collapsed onto reaches to the right. 
Procedure and Design 
Participants completed 512 trials, consisting of 8 mini-blocks. Each mini-block 
consisted of 64 trials, 32 for each player. Trials alternated whether it was the 
participants turn or the confederates turn, indicated by the appearance of the start area at 
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the bottom of that player’s side of the screen, and whether the target appeared to the left 
or right (from the viewpoint of the participants). Trials of the confederate varied in 
whether the target was simply presented, whether it was presented together with an 
obstacle between start and target area, or whether it was presented with no obstacle, but 
with a sound played through the confederate’s headphones that signalled to them to 
make a curved reach as if an obstacle was indeed present. Trials of the participant varied 
only in whether the target was simply presented, or whether it was presented together 
with an obstacle between start and target area. 
Each trial started with the start area appearing on the bottom middle of the current 
player’s screen side. As soon as they placed a finger in this area, the target area 
appeared to this player’s left or right, potentially with an obstacle on the straight path 
between them. If the current player was the confederate, a tone could additionally play, 
which signalled to them to make a curved reach as if an obstacle was indeed present. 
The target area remained present until it was entered by the player’s finger and then 




Trials were excluded when RTs were slower than 1500 ms. Erroneous trials of the 





We first verified that Social Inhibition of Return (sIOR, Skarratt et al., 2010) was 
present. Accordingly, participants should be slower in directing their finger to the same 
target as the previous’ player’s action, potentially reflecting difficulties of re-directing 
attention to the position one had attended during observation and then disengaged from 
(Skarratt et al., 2010). We therefore compared, with a repeated measures t-test, whether 
total movement times – from stimulus onset to the participant reaching the goal location 
– were faster when reaching to different target as the previous person than to the same 
target as the previous person. This was the case, t(34)=4.906, p<.001, d=.829. 
Participants took on average 692 ms. (SD=83) to reach the same target as the 
confederate but only 678 ms. (SD=86) to reach the other target. 
 
Does Social IOR depend on the similarity of own and others’ reaches? 
We also checked whether sIOR only reflects directing/withdrawing attention to the 
same/different goal object or whether it depends on the similarity of own and others 
action. To this end, the social IOR effect – calculated as the difference between reaches 
to the same minus a different target as the previous person – was entered into a 2 X 3 
repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors Own Action (straight, curved) and Seen 
Action (straight, curved without obstacle, curved with obstacle). If sIOR is sensitive 
action-related information, then it should differ depending on whether own and others’ 
actions are similar or dissimilar (e.g. making a curved reach after just having seen a 
straight or another curved reach). This predicted interaction will be evaluated against 
the standard alpha of p < .05. The two other potential main effects are not theoretically 
predicted and will therefore be evaluated against the Bonferroni-corrected alpha of 
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Figure 2c. sIOR effects depending on whether participants reached straight towards the 
target or around an obstacle and depending on whether they had just seen a straight 
reach, a curved reach without obstacle, or a curved reach around an obstacle. Error bars 
show the standard error of the mean. 
 
This ANOVA revealed no main effects of Own Action, F=3.504, p=.070, η2=.093, or 
Seen Action, F=3.309, p=.043, η2=.089 that would surpass the Bonferroni-corrected 
alpha for incidental findings. However, it did reveal the predicted interaction of both 
factors, F=3.478, p=.036, η2=.093. As can be seen in Figure 2c, the social IOR effect 
was generally larger when participants had produced a different curvature as the 
previous action. For straight reaches, sIOR was larger after having observed a curved 
reach or a reach around an obstacle compared to having observed a straight reach (both 
p < .019). In contrast, for curved reaches, sIOR was largest after having seen a straight 
reach and numerically reduced for curved reaches and reaches around an obstacle. This 
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is consistent with the hypothesis that the sIOR effect is not just an effect of returning 
attention towards a just attended target but depends on the action with which it was 
reached. Note however that the relevant interaction just passed the significance 
threshold of p < .05 and therefore needs to be confirmed in a separate study. 
Do own kinematics capture the kinematics of the seen reaches? 
Our central prediction was that participants’ own reaches should be higher after having 
seen a curved reach of the confederate, irrespective if they themselves have to reach 
around an obstacle or not. To test this, we calculated an imitation index that describes 
how much higher the participants’ reach was in each of the six bins after having just 
seen a curved reach compared to having just seen a (baseline) straight reach. To do so, 
we subtracted the Y coordinate of their reach in each bin after having seen a straight 
reach from the same coordinate when having seen (a) a curved reach without obstacle, 
and (b) having seen a curved reach with obstacle. This therefore derives two separate 
imitation indices for each bin, one for deviation induced by seeing a curved reach 
around an obstacle, and one for the deviations induced by seeing a curved reach even 
though there was no obstacle. Positive values on the imitation index indicate higher 
reaches when participants’ saw a curved reach, either around an obstacle or through 
empty space, compared to a straight reach.  
The data were analysed with a repeated measures ANOVA with the factors Bin (from 1 
to 6), Own Action (straight, curved) and Seen Action (curved reach with obstacle, 
curved reach without obstacle) and Target (same target as previous action, different 
target). We predicted the following three main effects and interactions, which will be 
evaluated against the usual alpha of p < .05. First, a main effect of Bin would reveal the 
predicted reach deviations compared to having just seen a straight “baseline” reach, 
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which should occur mostly for the intermediate bins, not for the start and end bins (start 
position and target). Second, a main effect of Seen Action, or its interaction with Bin, 
will reveal to what extent deviations differ for seeing curved with and without obstacle. 
Third, a main effect of Target, or its interactions with Bin, will reveal to what extent 
participants imitate seen reaches depending on whether they go to the same or different 
target as the previous reaches. As no other effects were predicted, and because 
ANOVAs are subject to alpha inflation due to multiple testing (Cramer, 2016), all other 
findings will be treated as incidental unless they pass the Bonferroni-corrected threshold 




Figure 3c. Deviations induced by seeing curved reaches with or without an obstacle, 
when reaches are directed the same target (left panel) or the other target (right panel) as 
the just seen reach of the confederate. In each panel, deviations induced by seen curved 
reaches are plotted in red and deviations induced by seen reaches around an obstacle are 
plotted in blue.  
 
The ANOVA revealed the predicted main effect of Bin, F=3.851, p=.002, η2=.102, 
showing that seeing curved reaches generally induced higher reaches after just having 
seen a curved reach of the other person, with deviations being the largest in bins 2 and 
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3, which correspond to the approximate obstacle location (i.e. automatic imitation of 
seen reach kinematics). The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of Target, F=11.712, 
p=.002, η2=.256, showing that deviations after having seen one of the curved relative to 
the straight reaches were generally larger when participants reached to a different 
compared to the same target as the experimenter. There were no other significant 
differences. In particular, there was no main effect of Seen Action, F < 1, revealing no 
overall differences in the size of deviations induced by seeing curved reaches with or 
without obstacles. Seen Action did not interact with any of the other experimental 
factor, all F < 1 for all, with the exception of a interaction of Seen Action and Bin that 
just failed to reach significance, F=2.007, p=.080, η2=.056. As this interaction did not 
meet conventional thresholds of significance it needs to be verified in further studies. 
As seen in Figure 3c, it may indicate, however, that deviations after seeing reaches 
around an obstacle were most pronounced at the obstacle locations (Bins 2 and 3) while 
deviations after curved reaches without an obstacle were more evenly distributed across 
bins. 
To further explore this potential interaction, we also analysed the imitation index across 
bins, separately for curved reaches and reaches around an obstacle, with a repeated 
measures ANOVA with the factors Bin (from 1 to 6), Own Action (straight, curved) and 
Target (same target as previous action, different target). For curved reaches around 
obstacles, the analysis replicated both the main effect of Bin, F=6.593, p<.001, η2=.162, 
showing more pronounced deviations at the middle bins, and the main effect of Target, 
F=5.160, p=.030, η2=.132, showing larger deviations for reaches towards the different 
target than the other actor. For curved reaches without obstacles, the analysis replicated 
the main effect of Target, F=13.696, p<.001, η2=.287, but not the main effect of Bin, 
F=1.272, p<.278, η2=.036. No other main effects or interactions that would pass the 
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Bonferroni-adjusted threshold for incidental findings in an ANOVA of p < .005. Thus, 
as indicated in the main ANOVA, deviations induced by seeing curved reaches or 
reaches around obstacles were roughly equal in size, but more pronounced for reaches 
towards a different compared to the same target. However, the deviations for curved 
reaches around an obstacle were evenly distributed around the trajectory but focussed 





Experiment 1c confirmed, first, the well-known Social IOR effect, such that reaches 
were generally faster towards the target that the other player had not reached to. In 
contrast to previous research, we found some tentative evidence that this effect 
depended on the match of the kinematics one needs to produce oneself and the 
kinematics one had just observed. The Social IOR effect was generally larger for 
reaches with a different kinematic than the one that was just observed being executed by 
the other player (the confederate). If substantiated in further experiments, this would 
imply that sIOR does not just reflect difficulties in re-orienting attention towards a 
target one had just disengaged from. Instead, it might reflect action-related processes, 
for example the inhibition of a previously observed reach trajectory if one needs to 
make a reach towards the same trajectory (e.g. Doneva, Atkinson, Skarratt & Cole., 
2017). 
The crucial question was whether participants’ own reach kinematics would capture the 
kinematics they had just observed, and whether this again depends on whether the same 
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or a different target was reached. We found that participants generally imitated the 
observed curvatures, both when having observed curved reaches around empty space 
and curved reaches around an obstacle. Thus, participants own reaches were generally 
higher after having just observed a curved reach with or without an obstacle, compared 
to having observed a straight reach. This dovetails with prior research by Hamilton and 
colleagues (2007) showing that people imitate kinematically even for actions whose 
kinematics seem to be unrelated to environmental constraints (e.g. obstacles). It 
provides direct evidence that imitation, in the present paradigm, is driven by the 
kinematic features of the observed reaches (i.e. their curvature) rather than conceptual 
factors, such as the presence or absence of obstacles.  
There was some tentative (marginally significant) evidence that induced deviations were 
more pronounced around the location of the obstacle after having observed reaches 
around an obstacle than after having observed a curved reach without an obstacle. 
Especially if one assumes that people imitate action kinematics such a difference would 
not be surprising. Even though not instructed, the experimenter’s own reaches around 
obstacles showed more pronounced curvatures at the object locations than for her 
reaches in which she was merely instructed to make a curved reach through empty space 
but where the kinematics were not constrained by visually available obstacle 
information. 
Importantly, we observed that this capturing of observed reach kinematics depended, 
like the Social IOR effect, on whether the participants’ reach was directed to the same 
or a different target as the just seen action of the experimenter. After having seen a 
curved reach, participants’ own reaches showed a higher curvature whenever they had 
to reach to a different target, compared to the same target. This finding is entirely 
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consistent with the proposed interpretation of the social IOR effect above. When 
reaching to the same target, the previously seen trajectory is inhibited or “over-written”. 
This slows down responses and generates the sIOR effect, but at the same time de-





Having demonstrated that participants automatically imitate kinematic parameters of 
observed actions, we set out to test whether this form of kinematic imitation is sensitive 
to observed action outcomes, as in our previous studies. In this experiment, two 
participants interacted with each other rather than a confederate. Participants performed 
the same task as before, as quickly as possible reaching from their start area to one of 
the two targets, while avoiding obstacles in half the trials. In contrast to Experiment 1c, 
there were no trials in which one of the players was instructed to make a curved reach in 
the absence of an obstacle. As in Experiment 1c, we measured whether participants 
would imitate the previous reach parameters of their partner, that is, that they would 
show a more curved reach after viewing a curved reach of their partner (compared to 
viewing a straight reach). The important manipulation was the varied outcome of each 
action. As soon as the reach of each player entered the target area we played one of two 
sounds: a “ker-ching” sound, previously designated as signalling a positive outcome 
(that this trial would take participants further towards experiment completion) or beep 
sound that was explained as a negative outcome (that this trial would be repeated later). 
This allows us to assess whether automatic imitation of observed kinematics is outcome 
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dependent. If so, then participants should particularly copy the kinematics of seen 
actions with positive outcomes, but not – or less so – of negative outcomes. If reaches 
towards the same target are, like in Experiment 1c, subject to social IOR, and inhibition 
of the just seen kinematics, we would expect that the effect of outcomes on kinematic 




Sixty-seven participants took part (age range from 18 to 37, mean age = 20.3, 20 males, 
16 left-handed), selected as in Experiment 1c and the initial study in which we 
established the effect. Two participants were excluded because they made more than 
20% errors. The final sample size of 65 gives us 80% power to detect effects of d>.352. 
On the basis of Experiment 1c, effect sizes - based on mean and standard deviation in 
the interaction contrast - are likely larger, Cohen’s d = 0.494.  
 
Apparatus and stimuli 
Apparatus and stimuli were identical to Experiment 1c, with the exception of two 
additional sound stimuli. One was a “ker-ching” sound to indicate the positive outcome 
and other a low beep indicating a negative outcome.  
 
Procedure and design 
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The procedure was identical to Experiment 1c, with the following exceptions. First, 
participants did not interact with an experimenter but a confederate, who alternated 
producing the reaches as in Experiment 1c. There were no reaches in which either 
participant had to produce curved reaches in the absence of an obstacle. In addition, one 
of the two sounds was randomly selected to be played after each participants’ action: a 
“positive” ker-ching sound, indicating speedier completion of the experiment, and a 
“negative” low beep, indicating that the trial would be completed and the experiment 
would take longer.  
 
Analysis 
Analysis proceeded as in Experiment 1c. We first tested whether the experiment would 
again reveal the well-established social IOR effect but tested now whether it was 
affected by action outcome as well as kinematic change or repetition. We will therefore 
report total response times for participants reaches towards the target, depending on 
whether the other player had just reached to the same target, whether the action used the 
same kinematics, and whether the previous action was followed by positive or negative 
outcome. 
As before, we were mainly interested in the imitation of the kinematic properties of the 
participants’ actions. As before, we simply compared the vertical position of 
participant’s reach at the horizontal position at which the obstacle would appear, both 
for when it was indeed present and when it was not, depending on whether the outcome 
of the previous action was positive or negative and depending on whether it was 






As before, we first established that the expected Social Inhibition of Return (sIOR) 
effect was present (Skarratt et al., 2010), reflected in slower total response times for 
responses to the same target as the previous actor than to a different target. As in 
Experiment 1c, a repeated measures t-test revealed the expected difference, t(63)=7.143, 
p<.001, d=.893, with highly similar effect size. Participants took, on average, 639 ms. 
(SD=71) to reach the same target as the confederate but only 621 ms. (SD=71) to reach 
the other target. 
 
Does Social IOR depend on the similarity of own and others’ reaches? 
As before, we then tested whether sIOR depends on the similarity of one’s own and the 
other’s action. We entered the social IOR effect – calculated as the difference between 
reaches to the same minus a different target as the previous person – into a 2 x 2 x 2 
repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors Outcome (positive, negative), Current 
Action (straight, obstacle, curved with obstacle) and Seen Action (straight, curved). As 
before, the 2-way interaction of Current Action X Seen Action tests whether the sIOR 
effect differs depending on whether people have to make the same or a different 
trajectory, and the 3-way interaction of Current Action X Seen Action X Outcome tests 
whether this difference in sIOR itself depends on the (positive or negative) outcome of 
the just seen action. However, the ANOVA did not reveal the interaction of Current 
Action X Seen Action, F=1.776, p=.187, η2=.027, that was seen in Experiment 1c, even 
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though the data showed the same numerical pattern, with generally less sIOR when the 
current and seen action were congruent. Neither was there a three-way interaction of 
Current Action, Seen Action and Outcome, F<1. None of the other main effects or 
interactions were significant, F<1.591, p>.212, η2>.025, for all. Thus, despite an 
identical numerical pattern as in Experiment 1c, there was not statistically robust 
evidence for a modulation of sIOR by any of the experimental variables of interest.  
 
 
Figure 4c. The left panel shows sIOR effects after having seen actions with positive 
outcomes and the right panel shows sIOR effects when having seen actions with 
negative outcomes. In each panel, sIOR effects are plotted depending on whether 
participants reached straight towards the target (left bars) or around an obstacle (right 
bars) and depending on whether they had just seen a straight reach (blue bars) or a 
curved reach around an obstacle (red bars). Error bars show the standard error of the 
mean. 
 
Do own kinematics mirror observed kinematics for actions with positive outcomes? 
As in Experiment 1c, participants’ reach heights along their trajectory were split into six 
bins of equal size along the X axis, with the data from reaches to the left collapsed onto 
reaches to the right, so that the first bin always indexes the location of the start area and 
last bin indexes the area of the target object. For each bin, we then calculated an 
imitation index that describes how much participants’ reach deviated after having just 
Seen reach straight 
 
Seen reach curved 
Seen reach straight 
 
Seen reach curved 
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seen a curved reach from the baseline of just having seen a straight reach, by subtracting 
the Y coordinate in each bin after having seen a straight reach from the same coordinate 
when having seen a curved reach. Positive values on the imitation index indicate higher 
reaches of the participants when having seen a curved reach relative to a straight reach. 
The data were analysed with a repeated measures ANOVA with the factors Bin (0 to 5), 
Own Action (straight, curved), Target (same target as previous action, different target) 
and Outcome (positive, negative). 
We predicted the following three main effects and interactions, which will be evaluated 
against the usual alpha of p < .05. First, as in Experiment 1c, a main effect of Bin will 
indicate the predicted reach deviations from baseline (having seen a straight reach), 
which should occur mostly for the intermediate bins, not for the start and end bins. 
Second, interactions of Bin and Target will reveal to what extent participants imitate 
seen reaches depending on whether they go to the same or different target as the 
previous reaches. Finally, interactions of Bin and Outcome will reveal to what extent 
action kinematics are mirrored specifically when actions with positive outcomes were 
observed. As no other effects were predicted, and because ANOVAs are subject to 
alpha inflation due to multiple testing (Cramer, 2016), all other findings will be treated 





Figure 5c. Imitation index. Deviations induced by seeing curved reaches relative to 
straight (baseline) reaches, when reaches are directed to the same target (left panel) or 
the other target (right panel) as the just seen reach of the confederate, and when the seen 
reaches achieved positive outcomes (blue lines) or negative outcomes (red lines). 
 
The ANOVA revealed the predicted main effect of Bin, F=12.646, p<.001, η2=.167, 
showing that reaches are generally more curved after just having seen a curved reach of 
the other person, especially in the bins that correspond to the approximate obstacle 
location. There was an interaction of Bin and Target, F=2.877, p=.015, η2=.044, 
showing again that kinematic imitation is stronger for movements to the different target 
object. Of theoretical relevance, there was in interaction of Target, Outcome and Bin 
that just failed to reach significance, F=3.537, p=.065, η2=.053. As can be seen in 
Figure 4c, deviations after seen curved reaches (relative to straight reaches) were 
stronger for reaches towards a different compared to the same target, and this difference 
was itself (marginally) larger for actions that produced positive compared to negative 







Experiment 2c confirmed, again, the Social IOR effect, such that reaches were generally 
faster towards the target that the other player had not reached to. In contrast to 
Experiment 1c, we did not find statistically robust evidence that this effect depended on 
the match of the kinematics one needs to produce oneself and the kinematics one had 
just observed, even though the pattern numerically supported this hypothesis. Together 
with Experiment, 1c, it may therefore provide tentative evidence for a role of sIOR 
beyond indexing difficulties in re-orienting attention towards a target one had just 
disengaged from, towards a role in inhibiting observed action features if reaching to the 
same target as one’s predecessor. 
Experiment 2c also confirmed that one’s own reach kinematics capture the kinematics 
one had just observed, such that own kinematics were generally more curved after just 
having observed a curved reach around an obstacle. Importantly, as in Experiment 2c, 
we found that this kinematic imitation specifically happened for reaches towards the 
target that the other person had not just reached to. After having seen a curved reach, 
participants’ own reaches showed a higher curvature whenever they had to reach to a 
different target, compared to the same target. As before, it suggests that, when reaching 
to the same target, the previously seen trajectory is inhibited or “over-written”, slowing 
down overall action speed, but reducing the effect of just seen action kinematics. 
The central question of Experiment 2c was, however, whether kinematic imitation 
depended not only on the target the reach was directed at, but also on the action 
outcome. We have found in previous studies that action outcome information 
determined whether actions were imitated, with automatic imitation generally restricted 
to actions with positive outcomes (e.g. wins but not losses in a game). The present data 
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provided similar results, but the results just failed to reach significance. We found that 
the increased curvature after seeing reaches around an obstacle was increased after 
seeing actions with positive compared to negative outcomes, specifically for reaches 
towards a different target. While this effect needs to be confirmed in further studies, it 
provides first tentative evidence that (a) the kinematics of an action are automatically 
imitated, specifically when the action produced positive outcomes, and (b) if the 
specific reach trajectory was not inhibited – causing sIOR – because one reached to the 




The tendency to imitate was previously deemed to arise from bottom-up processes 
which directly map observed actions onto the observers own motor system (Iacoboni et 
al., 1999; Heyes, 2012; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Other studies have challenged 
this view suggesting that automatic imitation occurs on the basis of action goals rather 
than the motor level (Bouquet et al., 2011; Campbell et al., 2017). Investigations into 
top-down guidance of automatic imitation have however been hampered by several 
difficulties, making it difficult to rule out contributions of spatial relationships between 
stimuli and responses, as well as the role of explicit need to evaluate observed actions 
and respond accordingly (e.g. “yes” there was a match, “no” there was not a match). 
Here we have provided a novel solution to these problems that allows one to directly 
measure automatic imitation of action kinematics, rather than mere reaction times or 
error rates, ruling out spatial confounds, and without participants’ need to evaluate the 
actions, in a paradigm that uses truly social face to face interaction.  
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In two experiments, the participants’ own action kinematics were measured in an 
alternating reaching task, in which the (confederate) partner produced straight 
movements, obstacle avoidance movements and curved movements without obstacles 
(Experiment 1c only). Both experiments replicated, first, the well-known sIOR effect 
such that participants were slower to reach to the same target as the previous player. In 
contrast to other studies on this effect (Skarratt, et al., 2010; Cole., 2017), there was 
tentative evidence that the effect depended upon whether the kinematics required to 
produce the response bore a similarity to the kinematics of the action one has just 
observed. Particularly in Experiment 1c, the sIOR effect was larger for movements 
made using differing kinematics suggesting that sIOR may include action components 
such as the inhibition of the trajectory of a previously observed movement, when one 
has to produce a different movement oneself. Because this effect was only present 
numerically in Experiment 2c, it would need to be replicated in further studies, before 
strong conclusions can be drawn. 
In addition, we established that automatic imitation in this task captures the observed 
kinematics of the partner’s movements. We found that participants generally imitated 
the observed curvatures regardless of necessity of the partner’s curved reach. Compared 
to a straight reach trajectory, participants’ reaches were higher when they had just 
observed a reach trajectory around an object as well as when they observed a similar 
reach trajectory around empty space. This is an important finding as it links imitation 
with the kinematic features of movements rather than environmental conceptual 
information such as the presence or absence of obstacles to avoid. An interesting 
finding in both experiments was that this automatic imitation depended whether the 
one’s own movement was directed to the same or different target as the just observed 
action, much like the sIOR effect described above. Compared to movements made to 
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the same target, reaches to different targets were affected more strongly by the observed 
curvature, suggesting that when reaching to the same target the previously observed 
movements trajectory is inhibited, slowing down the overall action speed as measured 
by the sIOR effect (see above). 
The main goal of Experiment 2c was to establish whether outcome information affected 
this automatic mirroring of observed reach curvatures. The actions in this experiment 
were therefore followed by a positive tone (indicating that the experiment would end 
earlier) or a neutral tone (the experiment would not end earlier). The results revealed an 
interaction that just failed to reach significance. The increase of curvature mirroring was 
stronger after positive outcome trials compared to negative outcome trials. Whilst this 
effect requires confirmation in other studies, it may provide the first tentative evidence 
that action kinematics are automatically imitated when the observed action had a 
positive outcome, even if participants are not instructed to evaluate the outcomes of the 
observed action, and the actions they make were independent of these outcomes, in 
contrast to all experiments in the previous chapters. It may therefore provide direct 
evidence that automatic imitation – like goal directed imitation in children – is driven 
not by bottom-up kinematic features of the observed action only, but that it reflects 
hierarchical, top-down guided processes in which these kinematics are always linked to 





Chapter 5: Discussion 
4.0 Summary of results 
Imitation is a pervasive social phenomenon. Research distinguishes the purposeful 
imitation of higher level features such as an action’s goals and intended outcomes 
(Byrne, 1993; Byrne., 2003; Meltzoff & Moore., 2008; Chartrand & Dalton., 2009; 
Wang & Hamilton., 2012) and the automatic imitation of relatively low-level 
movement-based characteristics, such as the movements kinematics or the body parts 
used (Brass et al., 2000; Genschow et al., 2013; Genschow & Florack., 2014; Genschow 
& Schindler., 2016). However, most of the research thus far has mostly focussed on 
either one or the other type of imitation but has not considered how the two phenomena 
relate to each other. This thesis, in contrast, tested whether automatic imitation is 
similarly affected by the outcome of the observed action as it is the case for goal-
directed imitation in children and primates, so that both phenomena can be described in 
a similar theoretical framework. 
 
4.1 Summary of results: Chapter 2 
The first experiment in Chapter 2 (Experiment 1a) tested whether information about 
whether an observed action had led to a positive or negative outcome would affect 
automatic imitation. Participants observed a player in a card game reach for one of two 
upside-down cards on a table. When the card was revealed, the participant had to assess 
whether the outcome of the event was positive or negative by comparing the chosen 
card with an opponent’s card: a higher number would beat the opponent card and a 
lower number loses to the opponent’s card. Participants made these win/lose judgments 
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with actions that either matched or did not match the observed action. It was found that 
motorically matching actions were facilitated only when the outcome of the observed 
action was positive. This provided the first indication that automatic imitation is driven 
by outcome information, similarly as known for goal-directed imitation in children and 
primates.  
However, an unexpected confound delayed this conclusion. The numerical value of the 
cards may have impacted the results as all of the positive outcomes were associated with 
higher value cards and negative outcomes with lower value cards. It may therefore be 
that card magnitude itself – rather than the action’s outcome as win or loss – may have 
induced the observed differences. The second experiment (Experiment 2b) therefore 
used the same stimuli but varied the participants’ instructions, such that, for some 
participants, higher cards were winning cards, lower cards for the other. For a third 
group, all valence was removed. Rather than asking participants to state whether the 
outcome was winning or losing, they simply identified whether the card which was 
revealed was higher or lower than the opponent's card. The results revealed that card 
magnitude indeed drove the automatic imitation effects. All conditions produced 
identical results. Actions that revealed higher value cards induced an automatic 
imitation effect, irrespective of whether these higher-value cards had to be interpreted as 
win/losses or not evaluated at all. 
While card magnitude itself is a relevant action outcome, it was important to show that 
more arbitrary outcome evaluations induce the same modulation of automatic imitation. 
The third experiment (Experiment 3a) therefore used the well-known symbols of rock-
paper-scissors on the card faces instead of numbers. Importantly, in this game, the 
symbol on the card face had no intrinsic value when presented alone. No one symbol 
was better or worse than the others and a judgement on the outcome of a game could 
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only be made by comparison of two of the symbols together (rocks beats scissors but 
loses to paper, scissors beat paper but loses to rock, paper beats rock but loses to 
scissors). This experiment therefore isolated the effect of positive and negative 
outcomes and eliminated additional influences of inherent card magnitude. The results 
revealed, as predicted, that automatic imitation was induced only by winning actions, 
showing that higher-level representations of positive and negative outcomes directly 
affected participant’s tendency to imitate. Strikingly, observing a losing action produced 
the opposite pattern: participants were faster to respond with the action that they had not 
just observed, similar to the correction of unsuccessful actions during goal directed 
imitation in children (Meltzoff, 1995).  
Another concern was that the egocentric nature of the stimuli used in the experiments 
may have allowed participants to encode the information about the actions more 
strongly than they might otherwise have done, for example, because they encoded the 
seen actions as their own, rather than actions of a model (Bach, Fenton-Adams, Tipper., 
2013; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2016). Indeed, first person actions have been shown to be 
produced faster and with greater subjective ease (Nishizawa, Kimura, & Goh: 2015). In 
addition, it is possible that automatic imitation in the negative outcome condition could 
have been eliminated because participants made a negative evaluation in general (i.e. 
responding yes/no), even if this evaluation was not linked to the action at all. The final 
experiment (Experiment 4a) therefore also varied, between participants, whether the 
actions were seen in the 1st and 3rd person perspective, and whether participants judged 
the outcome of the action that they just observed or evaluated how this action affected 
the outcome for the other, passive player that did not act. If previous effects of outcome 
sensitivity indeed reflect processes in imitation (rather than 1st person imagery for 
example), then it should be observed when actions from both perspectives are observed. 
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If it is crucial that the positive/negative outcome refer to the observed action, outcome 
sensitivity should be seen only when participants make judgements for the acting person 
but be eliminated or reduced when they make judgements for the other player. These 
predictions are precisely what was observed. Automatic imitation was found for 
positive outcomes in both viewing perspectives, but this modulation only occurred 
when participants evaluated the outcomes from the perspective of the acting player, not 
the opponent.  
Together, therefore, Chapter 2 showed that imitative responses were faster than non-
imitative responses replicating the well-known automatic imitation effect (e.g., Heyes, 
2011; Brass et al., 2001). However, this speeding-up of matching actions was only 
found when observing actions for which the outcome was positive, revealing that 
automatic imitation does not rely on only kinematic movement properties but is based 
on an hierarchical integration of these movements and the outcomes they achieve. This 
effect was independent of viewing perspective and tied to the (positive or negative) 
evaluation of the action that was currently observed.  
 
4.2 Summary of results: Chapter 3 
The experiments in Chapter 3 resolved another issue of the experiments in Chapter 2. It 
tested whether the observed automatic imitation effects reflected general spatial 
compatibility (Simon, 1969) or whether they indeed reflect a specific effect of imitating 
the motoric features of another’s actions. Moreover, to increase the ecological validity 
of our conclusions, the experiments in Chapter 3 did not use the card game scenario. 
Instead, participants observed instances of a model’s hand reaching towards or 
withdrawing from an object that was either safe to grasp (e.g. an orange) or painful to 
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grasp (e.g., a cactus) (Experiment 1b). As before, they had to evaluate the valence of the 
outcome, by making a response that either matched or mismatched the action they 
observed. By counterbalancing whether reaches were directed to the left and 
withdrawals to the right, or vice versa, and whether participants indicated positive 
outcomes with a leftward responses or negative ones with a rightwards one, or vice 
versa, it was possible to fully separate spatial and kinematic imitation effects. The data 
revealed that participants responded faster when their actions matched the kinematics of 
the previously observed action, regardless of spatial compatibility. Again, this 
facilitation occurred specifically for actions with positive outcomes. This experiment 
therefore replicated the findings of Chapter 2, showing that the outcome-dependency of 
automatic imitation is a replicable phenomenon across paradigms and stimulus sets.  
In order to ensure that this effect was specific to biological intentional motion, a further 
investigation (Experiment 2b) was conducted in which people viewed movements of 
inanimate “bubbles” that travelled the same paths as the hands in the previous 
experiment (Experiment 2b). Although participants made exactly the same judgements 
as the previous experiments, the data revealed that action kinematics – movements 
towards or away from the objects – were generally imitated less. However, although the 
effect of outcome guidance of automatic imitation was eliminated in the reaction time 
data, it was still present in the error rates. The data therefore suggested that the outcome 
modulation of automatic imitation is a cognitively controlled process that, triggered by 






4.3 Summary of results: Chapter 4 
One problem of the current studies may be that participants were actively evaluating the 
outcomes during observation of movements. The data from Chapter 3, in particular, 
suggested that such an instruction can, by itself, induce a teleological encoding of 
actions, thereby inducing automatic imitation.  Further investigation was needed to test 
the outcome sensitivity of automatic imitation in a task in which participants were not 
explicitly instructed to evaluate observed action outcomes. 
We developed a new task that integrates all components of the prior studies – capturing 
kinematic properties rather than spatial ones, and positive versus negative outcomes – 
but put them in a context in which people interacted with a real person and in which 
they were not explicitly asked to make judgments about the action’s outcomes. A first 
experiment (Experiment 1c) validated the task and assessed whether it indeed measures 
kinematic imitation. Participants sat opposite an experimenter with a touch screen laid 
flat between them. They took turns placing their finger on the screen in a home area 
directly in front of them and then moving their finger across the screen to a target area 
which appeared to the left or right. There were three conditions. Either the experimenter 
moved straight from the home screen to the target area (efficient movement), the 
experimenter made a curved reach to the target to avoid an object (necessary 
movement) or the experimenter made a curved movement to the target area when no 
obstacle was present (unnecessary movement). Next to finding the usual Social IOR 
effects that are present in such task (slower responses towards objects another had just 
acted on), the data revealed automatic imitation of kinematic action features: observing 
curved reaches, regardless of whether there was an obstacle present or not, produced 
more curvature in participants’ responses. In other words, participants imitated the 
observed movement trajectory, and did not just simply respond to obstacle presence. 
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This established the validity of the experimental paradigm for measuring imitation of 
kinematic action features. 
In a second experiment (Experiment 3c) we then used a simplified version of the task, 
in which there were only two conditions – seeing someone reach around an obstacle or 
straight towards the goal – and manipulated again the outcome of these actions. We 
played a random tone after each action, which indicated either a positive outcome (the 
experiment would finish one trial earlier than expected) or a negative outcome (the 
experiment would not end one trial earlier). The results showed again that people 
imitate the kinematics of observed movements. Participant’s movements were generally 
more curved after observing a curved reach, and there was tentative evidence that these 
effects are stronger for actions that are made immediately following an action with a 
positive outcome compared to negative ones. This provided the first evidence for the 
proposal that the outcome modulation of automatic imitation can even be observed 
when the outcomes are not explicitly judged and for actions that do not, in contrast to 
the previous experiments, are tied to the outcome evaluation itself. 
 
4.4  Main findings 
This thesis provided five main findings. First, all experiments in the thesis confirmed 
that people have a general tendency to imitate the actions of others (e.g., Cracco & 
Brass., 2019; Scott, Emerson, Dixon, Tayler, & Eaves., 2019; Heyes, 2011; Bien et al., 
2009). In Chapter 2, people were faster to respond with the same hand in the card games 
than they did with the opposite hand across number-related outcomes, symbol-related 
outcomes and in first and third person perspectives. In Chapter 3, people responded 
faster with forwards movements after observing a forward movement and to backwards 
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movements after observing a backwards movement. In Chapter 4, participants reliably 
imitated the kinematics of the other participants’ actions, making more curved reaches 
after just having observed a partner make the same curved reach, and straighter reaches 
after having the partner seen make a straight reach. Thus, automatic imitation was found 
in all of the studies and was observed even though the similarity of own and others’ 
movements was completely task irrelevant. 
Second, the experiments in Chapter 3 and 4 showed that the effect of automatic 
imitation reflects the kinematics of the observed movement and can be dissociated from 
similar facilitation effects induced by spatial compatibility (for similar findings, see 
Boyer et al., 2012). In Chapter 3 (Experiments 1b & 2b), spatial compatibility and 
movement compatibility were separated, revealing that motorically compatible 
movements, regardless of direction of movement were responded to faster than 
incompatible movements. In Chapter 4, we found that people copied the kinematics of 
the observed movement, such that their own trajectory became more curved both when 
just having observed the other person make a curved reach around an obstacle or empty 
space (Experiments 1c & 2c). Thus, automatic imitation reflects not only spatial 
components of the seen actions (e.g. the location of goal objects and fingers within the 
body schema), but also the observed action kinematics. 
Third, automatic imitation effects were generally larger when the outcomes of the 
observed actions were positive. In Chapter 2, this tendency to respond imitatively only 
for actions with positive outcomes was revealed when using numerical cards values 
(when the revealed card was larger than the opponent card (Experiment 1a)), and when 
symbols were used to replace these for winning trials opposed to losing trials 
(Experiments 3a & 4a). In Chapter 3, this was also the case when observed reaches and 
withdrawals were judged to be appropriate as opposed to inappropriate, relative to a 
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painful or safe goal object (Experiment 2). Additionally, in Chapter 4, where 
participants did not actively make a judgement on the outcome of a trial, they 
nevertheless showed a tendency for stronger imitation of the kinematics of the 
movement observed in the previous trial if the outcome of that previous action was 
positive (Experiment 2c). For that reason, we can conclude that automatic imitation 
effects are facilitated for positive outcomes and absent or reversed for negative 
outcomes, similar to research on goal directed imitation in children (Wilks, Collier‐
Baker, & Nielsen, 2015). 
Fourth, the facilitation effect for positive outcomes was observed even when the 
outcome was not related to the observed movement. While in Chapter 3 the action 
outcomes were arguable closely linked to the specific action that participants observed 
(e.g. grasping or withdrawing from a painful object (Experiment 1b)), in Chapter 2, all 
movements observed were identical and only the outcome of the trial differed randomly, 
in a manner that was statistically independent of the actions observed (Experiments 1a, 
3a & 4a). The same was true for Chapter 4 (Experiments 1c & 2c). The outcome was 
presented randomly after each action and was not related to the previous movement in 
any way. Thus, the tendency to imitate observed actions with positive outcomes arises 
even though the outcomes themselves are not proximal parts of the action, but their 
distal effects, even if these effects are not causally linked to the actions. 
Fifth, automatic imitation – but not its outcome modulation – seemed to be driven by 
bottom-up perceptual information about the intentionality of the observed movements. 
In Chapter 3, general automatic imitation effects were extinguished when participants 
were presented with non-biological stimuli (i.e. a bubble traversing the same trajectories 
as the hands (Experiment 2b)). Whilst outcome guidance remained, the overall 
facilitation effect for imitative actions was substantially reduced. Ergo, the general 
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automatic imitation effect seems to be at least partially bottom-up driven and decreases 
when seeing non-biological stimuli. The observed outcome modulation, however, 
seemed to be at least partially tied to the explicit evaluation of the observed actions. The 
effect was more robust when participants had to explicitly evaluate action outcomes 
(Chapters 2 and 3) than when outcomes were incidentally varied (Chapter 4). In 
addition, the outcome modulation of automatic imitation was present even when 
participants observed – evaluated – the movements of inanimate bubbles. The outcome 
guidance of automatic imitation therefore seems to be at least partially under top-down 
control, driven by tasks to evaluate the observed movements in a teleological manner. 
 
5.1. Relation to prior studies, captured by a recent meta-analysis 
A recent meta-analysis reviewed important questions about automatic imitation that 
neatly capture current debates in the literature (Cracco et al., 2018). They first asked 
which of three processes had the most influence on automatic imitation: spatial 
compatibility, effector compatibility or movement compatibility. The investigation 
found that automatic imitation could be influenced by - but not reduced - by controlling 
for spatial compatibility and that effector compatibility had more of an influence on 
automatic imitation than movement compatibility. While we did not manipulate effector 
compatibility (e.g. Bach, Peatfield & Tipper, 2007), we could rule out an effect of 
spatial compatibility. When spatial compatibility was controlled in Experiments 1b & 
2b, we found automatic imitation still persisted. This is clear evidence that automatic 
imitation captures action kinematics, as suggested by the meta-analysis (Cracco et al., 
2018) and other studies (e.g., Hayes, Roberts, Elliott, & Bennett., 2014).  
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Second, the meta-analysis found that automatic imitation could be influenced by periods 
of incompatible sensory motor training, for example, when participants are instructed to 
respond to hand stimuli with foot presses and vice versa (Cracco et al., 2018). Although 
this weakened the effect of the compatible relationships, they found that there was no 
increase in automatic imitation when participants were given compatible sensory motor 
training. They concluded that automatic imitation was a result of overlearned 
perception-action associations, which must be acquired through associative learning and 
used this for evidence to support ASL theory (Heyes., 2012; Brass & Heyes., 2005). In 
all of our experiments, especially in Chapter 2 and 4, we found evidence that outcome 
information, which was not related to the action itself, had an effect on automatic 
imitation. Whilst automatic imitation may be flexible in terms of stimulus-response 
learning, our data suggest that it is also affected by social top-down influences, and not 
just pre-established associative connections between motor responses and visual stimuli 
(Cooket al., 2010). It is likely that this effect emerges due to sensory predictions of the 
consequences of the observed action (Blakemore, & Decety., 2001).   
Third, the authors concluded that automatic imitation is indeed largely automatic and 
driven by bottom-up stimulus information, relatively unaffected by top-down control. 
The meta-analysis found that automatic imitation is very fast, and that it is measured 
best at stimulus onset asynchronies between 80-150 ms between movement observation 
and response target. Moreover, if attention is directed away from the observed action a 
reduction in the effect is observed but the effect is not eliminated. Finally, when 
perceptual load tasks are applied, rather than eliminate the automatic imitation, it 
appears to reverse the effect (Catmur, 2016). In contrast, in all of our experiments, we 
see an influence of higher-level outcome information on automatic imitation. 
Specifically, we found that automatic imitation is facilitated by actions with positive 
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outcomes and absent or reversed with actions that have negative outcomes, despite the 
consequence of the action being an entirely distal component of the action, and 
statistically unrelated to it. Here we must argue that whilst automatic imitation may 
indeed be automatic, it is flexibly deployed depending on observed outcomes, providing 
direct evidence for top-down control.  
Fourth, the meta-analysis revealed that automatic imitation is greater for goal-less 
actions, or, in other words, bottom-up observations of movements, rather than object-
directed or communicative actions which require top-down processing, and which imply 
clear goals (e.g. reaching for an object, thumbs-up or Okay hand gestures). They 
therefore suggest that any automatic imitation effects reflect movement parameters 
instead of goal information. But, as the authors recognise, this could be a result of 
movement characteristics being themselves coded as the action goal, when no other 
goals are apparent (Cracco et al., 2018). The present studies did not manipulate the 
goal-directedness of the actions, but showed that automatic imitation can be reliably 
observed for such actions and that it is, in such circumstances, reliably affected by the 
outcomes of the observed actions, that is, whether they achieve or fail to achieve their 
intended goal (e.g. win in a card game, safely pick up an object, proceed through the 
trials in the experiment).   
 
 
5.2. Relation to studies in children’s goal directed imitation 
The findings from the automatic imitation experiments reported in this thesis map 
closely onto work in children's goal-directed imitation, for which outcome guidance is 
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well-established. As reviewed in the introduction, children’s goal-directed imitation is 
seen as a top-down guided, “rational” process, in which the imitator links the seen body 
movements (the “means”) to the changes in the environment they produce (the “ends”) 
and uses this knowledge to achieve the same outcome. For example, in one experiment 
children observed an adult act out a set of actions on objects which made something 
interesting happen (e.g. a wooden box with a wheel and a handle that opened to reveal a 
toy). During half of these observations the adult model verbally communicated that the 
action was either purposeful (“There”) or accidental (“Whoops”). After each 
observation children were allowed the opportunity to interact with the object to try to 
complete the same action. Imitation was twice as likely to occur after the child observed 
an adult perform an action intentionally than if they observed an accidental action 
(Carpenter et al., 1998).  
As children age, their imitation allows for more flexibility but remains firmly outcome-
guided. For example, they learn to distinguish between intentional and error-full 
movements and correct movements so that they achieve the outcomes the model failed 
to achieve (Wohlschläger et al., 2003). If they observe an inefficient action (e.g. using 
one’s head to turn on a light), they will readily use different bodily effectors should this 
allow them to complete tasks more effectively (Gergely et al., 2002). 
The results reported in this thesis provided very similar findings for automatic imitation. 
In this thesis, we have established that responses that match a just-observed action are 
facilitated particularly when these actions had positive outcomes, but not when they had 
negative outcomes. This was the case when automatic imitation was tested when 
viewing actions in a card game (Chapter 2), when viewing people reaching to or 
withdrawing from painful or safe objects (Chapter 3), and, tentatively, when making 
reaches towards or around obstacles in a two-person social interaction (Chapter 4). Note 
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that these results cannot be explained simply by assuming that observers copy the goal 
of an observed action, rather than the outcome. In all experiments in this thesis, the 
goals were the same for all observed actions; the only component that influenced 
automatic imitation was whether the outcome actually achieved that goal. The findings 
therefore show a very similar outcome guidance of automatic imitation as is present for 
the goal directed imitation in children. 
A specific finding in children’s literature on automatic imitation is that children, after 
having seen a model not achieve their intended goal, correct the observed action 
towards a more appropriate one (e.g., Carpenter et al., 1998; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 
2005). While we did not specifically test whether automatic imitation mirrors these 
findings, several experiments provided evidence that viewing actions with negative 
outcomes produced negative compatibility effects (e.g. Experiments 1a, 3a, 4a, 1b), 
facilitating the alternative action that was not observed. While this has to be confirmed 
by further studies, this may be taken as evidence that adult participants, in the same way 
as described in the children’s literature, attempt to correct observed actions towards the 
alternative or more desirable outcome and that this correction directly affects automatic 
imitation. 
Finally, a striking finding was that while, in the experiments in Chapter 3, observing an 
inanimate object generally reduced automatic imitation, the outcome dependency was 
not reduced in the same manner (Experiment 2b). While this may be surprising from 
theories assuming that automatic imitation is reduced or absent when inanimate objects 
– or objects believed to be inanimate – are observed (Gelman, Durgin, & Kaufman., 
1995; Opfer, & Gelman., 2011), the findings reveal a link to biological motion 
perception studies with children. Young children are able to attribute goals to inanimate 
objects if they move in a way that appears intentional and they consistently behave in a 
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meaningful way. The results indicate that the delivery of instructions to evaluate the 
bubble’s movement teleologically (in terms of whether they achieved the outcome) 
allowed participants to attribute an intention to the objects and again facilitated the 
copying of positive but not negative movements. 
5.3 Theoretical implications 
The results in this thesis have important theoretical implications. Goal-directed and 
automatic imitation are usually described by different theories, which differ in whether 
they account for imitation of the actions’ forms as such (e.g. the bodily movements) or 
the higher-level goals of the action. Simulation theories, for example, claim that 
imitation is possible due to the internal recreation of observed actions in the motor 
system of the observer (Rizzolatti et al., 2010; Gallese, & Goldman, 1998; Arbib, 
Billard, Iacoboni, & Oztop, 2000). This is computed by the observer using mirror 
neurons, which are assumed to “directly match” the action’s kinematic features to an 
action in the observer’s motor repertoire (Rizzolatti et al., 2014; Rizzolatti et al., 2011; 
Sebanz et al., 2003) and therefore ‘mirror’ others’ behaviours as if the observer were 
performing the observed action. This internal simulation of the action allows the 
observer access to its meaning or goals. Automatic imitation, in such models, reflects 
this bottom-up matching of observed actions to a similar action in the repertoire of the 
observed (Iacoboni., 2009). 
The findings of this thesis are not compatible with such an account. Across all 
experiments, the data suggests that automatic imitation is not just guided by bottom-up 
visual input about the action’s kinematics, but by knowledge about the consequences of 
actions: whether they produced positive or negative outcomes. The prior knowledge of 
felt consequences of acting upon painful or safe objects (Chapter 3), the understanding 
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whether cards won or lost (Chapter 2), or, tentatively, whether the action sped up the 
experiment (Chapter 4) affected people’s tendency to imitate. It is not possible to 
explain these results using a simple bottom-up mechanism. At the very least, one 
therefore needs to argue that simulation proceeds top-down, driven by viewing an action 
with positive outcomes (all experiment in this thesis), or by an attempt to mentally 
correct an observed unsuccessful action towards a more appropriate alternative 
(Experiments 1c & 2c). 
Other theories, such as ASL argue that automatic imitation (and mirror neurons as its 
neuronal substrate) are an artefact of associative, domain-general learning mechanisms 
(Brass & Heyes, 2005; Heyes 2010; Heyes., 2012). The theory states that associations 
between visual representations of actions and their motor representations are initially 
unconnected but develop gradually whenever there is contingent motor output and 
sensory activation (e.g. when we watch our own actions or our facial expressions as 
baby are mirrored by our parent). With enough time this leads to bidirectional 
connections between representations for the perception and the execution of actions. 
While this provides a powerful account of automatic imitation, it does not seem to be 
able to explain the present results. All experiments revealed that the response time 
benefit for imitative actions was only seen for action with positive outcomes – those 
which were winning as opposed to losing (Chapter 2), appropriate as opposed to 
inappropriate to an object (Chapter 3) and those which were deemed to benefit the 
participant as opposed to those which did not (Chapter 4). In ASL, like in simulation 
theories, automatic imitation simply emerges from bottom-up stimulus-response links. 
Both negative and positive action outcomes would therefore elicit automatic imitation 
equally, especially as both types of outcome were not part of the observed action, but 
one of their randomly following distal consequences, and therefore equally associated 
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with both action possibilities (i.e., the left and right reaches). At the very least, one 
would therefore need to argue again that these automatic sensory-to-motor associations 
between observed actions and actions one can produce are modulated by top-down 
factors. However, such top-down factors are outside the scope of ASL theories and they 
could not account for the negative compatibility effects that were observed in some of 
our experiments (e.g., Chapter 2, 3 & 4), and which might mirror the automatic 
correction of an unsuccessful action towards its more appropriate counterpart, as 
sometimes seen in children’s goal directed imitation (Wohlschläger et al., 2003). 
While the differences are more subtle, the present data are also not consistent with 
approaches that argue that imitation reflects the goals attributed to an action (e.g., 
Liepelt et al., 2008; Bertenthal et al., 2003). For example, Csibra argues that automatic 
imitation emerges because the observer’s motor system searches for an action with 
which it could achieve the same action goal as that attributed to the model (Schwier, 
Van Maanen, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2006), irrespective of whether this movement 
corresponds to the action that was actually observed. For example, children sometime 
do not imitate the observed body movements (e.g. pressing a light switch with the head, 
Gergely et al., 2002), but use actions that achieve the same action more efficiently 
(pressing the light with their hands). However, the goals are identical in all experiments 
in this thesis, so the action that the motor system “emulates” should be identical as well. 
The only way these models could account for the present outcome guidance would be to 
propose that observed successful outcomes prompts the search towards the observed 
action, but unsuccessful ones bias it towards an alternative, perhaps more successful 
action. However, so far, these models do not include such a post-hoc, corrective 
processing step.  
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The one class of theories that fully accounts for both the findings in goal-directed 
imitation in children and the present results seem to be ideomotor theories of action and 
action observation (Camus, Hommel, Brunel, & Brouillet, 2018; Naber, Eijgermans, 
Herman, Bergman, & Hommel, 2016; Hommel, 2015; Hommel et al, 2001). These 
models argue that human action learning is fundamentally hierarchical. When we carry 
out actions ourselves, ideomotor theories propose that we form action representations 
that connect proximal action features (e.g. extending a finger to press a button) to the 
distal effects they produce in the environment (e.g., turning on a light). Once these 
representations are established, observers can use these hierarchical action 
representations to control their own behaviours. They only need to think if the distal 
effect they want to achieve, and – via the now established associations – the relevant 
motor behaviour to execute becomes activated.  
Our data suggest that automatic imitation is best described in such a framework. Thus, 
when people observe an action, hierarchical action representations are established that 
link the observed actions’ proximal features (e.g. using a left or right arm or making a 
reach or withdrawal) to the outcomes they produce (e.g. winning in the card game, 
safely grasping an object). As long as these hierarchical representations are coded in 
terms of actions and outcomes one can produce oneself (e.g., Hommel, 2015; di 
Pellegrino et al., 1992), they can then be used to guide both goal-directed and automatic 
imitation. Thus, when intentionally reproducing an action, observers just need to re-
activate the positive outcome they want to also activate the just observed motor 
behaviours, enabling goal-directed imitation. Similarly, if these outcomes are positive 
and are therefore congruent with the observer’s own goals, they would automatically 
induce automatic imitation, as these outcomes automatically also activate the proximal 
motor behaviours that have just achieved them. 
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Together, therefore, this thesis points to set of theoretical approaches that are useful not 
only to describe the current set of data but can also account for the patterns observed in 
the literature. They imply the presence of hierarchical action representations whenever 
we watch the actions of others, which causally link the observed action outcomes to the 
means with how they were achieved and can then guide both automatic and goal 
directed imitation.  
 
5.4 Future directions 
The present findings open up several further avenues for research. One important 
question that could not be fully resolved in this thesis is whether outcome guidance of 
automatic imitation is even present when not directly evaluated by participants. All 
experiments have shown that automatic imitation shows a similar outcome-dependence 
as goal-directed imitation, particularly when participants were explicitly asked to 
evaluate the observed actions’ outcomes. It was less clear whether the same is true when 
these outcomes were not explicitly evaluated in Chapter 4, Experiment 2, where the 
effect just failed to reach the threshold for significance (but pointed in the direction of 
outcome-guidedness).  
Several factors might have contributed to this lack of a reliable difference. Visual search 
studies have revealed that allocation of attention is based on the ‘learned value’ and 
requires it to be motivationally salient and rewarding (Failing, Nissens, Pearson, Le 
Pelley, & Theeuwes, 2015). Anecdotally, however, participants reported losing count of 
outcomes very quickly from the onset of the game, for positive outcomes in particular. 
This is consistent with the observation that people tend to orient attention towards 
negative stimuli more quickly than to positive or neutral stimuli (Kaspar, Gameiro & 
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König, 2015). However, such a shift would be particularly problematic because learning 
is widely known to be driven primarily by positive outcomes (rewards providing greater 
retention O'Doherty, Cockburn, & Pauli, 2017) and the same was true for automatic 
imitation in the present task. To remedy this problem, one could offer a greater reward 
for achieving positive outcomes or draw attentional towards them by displaying a 
record of some sort such as a counter. This would allow participants to see what they 
had achieved so far and focus attention on the relevant positive aspect.  
Should such improvements prove to be effective, this task would provide an ideal 
platform for further investigations on outcome guidance in automatic imitation, 
allowing one to trace, for example, the development of outcome-based imitation during 
children’s development. It has been argued that children go through periods of change 
in their imitation habits, moving through intentional imitation, over-imitation (see 
Hoehl, Keupp, Schleihauf, McGuigan, Buttelmann & Whiten., 2019 for a review; 
Keupp, Behne, Zachow, Kasbohm, & Rakoczy., 2015) and automatic imitation 
(McGuigan et al., 2011). However, establishing this sequence has been difficult as there 
has been no useful task to measure automatic imitation in young children. The task in 
Chapter 4 provides a simple game on a touch screen, with very easy-to-follow 
instructions and actions that children of all age groups can carry out. It would, therefore, 
provide a powerful tool to test when outcome-guided automatic imitation emerges and 
whether it – like ideomotor theories suggest – is linked to the intentional ability to form 
hierarchical representations of others’ actions, and therefore follows directly the use of 
these representations during goal-directed imitation. 
More broadly, such a task could also disentangle to what extent such the observed 
sensitivity to others’ outcomes depends on the participants’ relationship to one another. 
In the real world, we work closely with others to achieve joint goals but also compete 
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against them to satisfy personal goals. Future studies could incorporate differential 
goals for participants. It would be important to establish, for example, whether 
participants still imitated the action leading to a positive outcome of another, even if 
having a different – perhaps even opposing – goal themselves. Consider a task like that 
in Chapter 4 in which different tones represent different outcomes for the two 
participants, with one indicating a rewarding outcome for participant 1, and another 
indicating a rewarding outcome for participant 2, and third neutral tone where neither is 
rewarded. It would then be possible to compare automatic imitation that is elicited when 
participants observe their peer make an action that has a positive outcome for 
themselves, or an outcome that provides a positive outcome for the other participant 
(compared against a baseline of neutral outcomes for both). If automatic imitation 
indeed reflects the integration of action outcomes into a hierarchical action 
representation, one may predict that participants imitate another’s action even if it was 
positive for this other participant, not themselves (but see the data from Chapter 2, 
Experiment 4a, in which actions were automatically imitated only when evaluating the 
outcome for this player, not the opponent). 
Such a task could also manipulate participants’ affiliation or group membership. 
Participants could be introduced to each other as competitors, each attempting to be the 
first to achieve a finite number of rewarding outcomes based on the three tones as 
described above, or as collaborators, who have to achieve a number of positive 
outcomes together (even if each “collects” different tones to achieve this). It is likely 
(e.g., Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998) that imitation would be larger for the 
observation of others’ positive outcomes in the joint-goal condition, compared to the 
competing-goals condition. In this way, the tasks developed here could be extended to 
investigating joint-action, and therefore have implications on how people coordinate 
144 
 
with each other to achieve outcomes far beyond individual capabilities, as seen in the 
biggest human achievements to date (from building cities to the moon-landing). 
 
6. Conclusions 
The experiments in this thesis have confirmed that people have a general tendency to 
imitate the actions of others and that this imitation reflects the kinematic properties of 
the observed movements, as argued before. The novel finding of this thesis was the 
stronger imitation when the modelled action resulted in a positive (or appropriate) 
action outcome, which was found across two different experimental paradigms (and 
potentially a third). This persistent outcome-dependency challenges models that explain 
automatic imitation through a simple bottom-up matching of observed kinematic 
information to the observers own repertoire, either through a precisely evolved mirror 
system (e.g., Iacoboni, Koski, Brass, Bekkering, Woods, Dubeau, & Rizzolatti, 2001; 
Iacoboni, 2009) or due to sensorimotor-learning of motor commands and their 
perceptual consequences (e.g., Heyes, 2001, 2011). In such models, both negative and 
positive action outcomes should have elicited automatic imitation equally. That these 
experiments do in fact elicit such a modulation is especially poignant, as both types of 
outcome were never part of the observed action, but a randomly following distal 
consequence, and therefore equally associated with both action possibilities (for 
example, left and right movements towards targets).  
The experiment series in this thesis therefore links automatic imitation in adults to the 
top-down control in goal-directed imitation in children and primates (Call et at., 2002; 
Gattis et al., 2002; Elsner, 2007). Much like the data observed here, children generally 
do not imitate all actions, but specifically those that produce positive or successful 
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outcomes (for a review, see Elsner, 2007). Moreover, they focus on the actions’ 
outcome and use the same body movements only if these body movements appear 
critical for action success (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2016; Carpenter et al., 1998; Meltzoff, 
1995; Over et al., 2010) and more efficient actions are not available to them (e.g., 
Tomasello, 1996; Gergely et al., 2002; Buttelmann et al., 2007). The finding that 
outcome modulation was observed even when movement of inanimate bubbles were 
evaluated does not challenge this link. Even very young children can see inanimate 
object movements as goal directed, if these movements show features of intentional 
movement, such as avoidance of obstacles or a speed up towards a goal (e.g. Gao, 
McCarthy, & Scholl, 2010). They also link to findings in adults showing that 
participants embody (i.e. take the perspective) of inanimate objects in Heider and 
Simmel-like displays (Heider & Simmel, 1944), if they follow intentional movement 
patterns and consistently behave in a meaningful way (Zwickel & Mueller, 2010). The 
task to evaluate action outcomes may therefore induce a similar, flexible deployment of 
teleological evaluation of the observed movements, even if carried out by inanimate 
agents. 
Together, therefore, our data argue that both forms of imitation – automatic and goal-
directed imitation – may be guided by similar hierarchical representations that are 
established when watching other people and which combine both the seen body 
movements and the outcomes they achieve in the environment. If one follows such a 
model, the difference between automatic and goal-directed imitation may not lie in top-
down versus bottom-up control, but simply in the mode of activation of these 
hierarchical means-end relationships: while goal-directed imitation requires their 
voluntary activation (or formation during observation), they are created spontaneously 
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